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ABSTRACT
This project studies the history of Hong Kong in administering asylum seekers along 
the timeline from managing Vietnamese refugees to today’s non-refoulement 
claimants, and outlines how government policy has been developing following a 
series of incidents and evolutions.  Types of social problems have been resulted from 
the influx of asylum seekers would also been examined.
The objective of this project is to recommend practical and appropriate policy choices 
for the Government to administer the asylum seekers through comprehensive study 
and analysis on current foreign practices as well as the governance, political dynamics 
and policy tools adopted by the Government to handle this issue over the history of 
Hong Kong. 
In analysing policy processes involving administration of asylum seekers, three 
interrelated aspects of importance are identified: the governance arrangements 
concerning how policies are initiated, regulated and sustained; the reasons for, and 
dynamics involved in, the adoption of particular policies; and actions taken through 
the use of various policy tools. These aspects, considered together, establish the 
analytical framework of the project. 
This framework put together theory of Knill and Tosun about mode of governance, 
three-streams model of Kingdon and McDonnell & Elmore’s theory in categorizations
of policy tools as skeleton, which is supplemented by Braithwaite’s theory of 
responsive regulatory pyramids prioritizing various policy tools and to construct a 
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comprehensive policy plans. Applying this framework, a systematic method is used 
to analyse how policies on asylum seeker have been shaped and administered in Hong 
Kong. Empirical studies are also conducted upon policy choices adopted by the 
government along from the past to the present in administering asylum seekers.
By reviewing the practices adopted by Germany, Australia and UK, foreign practices 
were evaluated to ascertain whether their policies are applicable to Hong Kong under 
full assessment of the socio-political environment, culture, legal system and 
population of refugee in Hong Kong. 
Lastly, through extensive and thorough analysis and assessment on various policy 
choices, recommendations about an appropriate set of policy tools, together with 
comprehensive policy proposals are made to the Hong Kong SAR Government with a 
view to better administering asylum seekers in Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Focus, Objective and Background of the Project
The objective of this project is to recommend practical and appropriate policy choices 
for the Government to administer the asylum seekers / non-refoulement claimants 
(NRCs) through comprehensive study and analysis on current foreign practices as 
well as the governance, political dynamics and policy tools adopted by the 
Government to handle this issue over the history of Hong Kong. Along the timeline 
from managing Vietnamese refugees (VRs) to today’s NRCs, the Government has 
taken the leading role to formulate systems and policies to administer NRCs in 
accordance with laws, conventions and experiences.
Since Hong Kong is not alone to face this prolonging and complicated issues
stemmed from the NRCs, other states in particular developed countries around the 
world are also making effort to formulate various policies to handle these issues.  
Nonetheless there is no a perfect policy which could perfectly cope with these matters 
up to now.  This project starts with the history of Hong Kong in administration of
asylum seekers by a variety of policy tools.  It then outlines how the policy has been 
developing, following a series of incidents and evolutions and what types of social 
problems have been resulted from the influx of NRCs. 
Since the introduction the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT convention) to Hong Kong in 1992, the 
Government has an obligation to protect people who are in danger of being subjected 
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to torture.  In addition, a set of court rulings have been handed down since June 2004 
and therefore, the screening procedures for the non-refoulement claims are of much 
higher standards of fairness.  Meanwhile, the claimants pending screening 
assessment are fighting for better humanitarian assistance and legal support. 
The influx of the NRCs and demanding standards required for managing them have
generated a number of social problems, such as upsurge of crime rate committed by 
the claimants, excessive public expenditures originated from prolonging screening 
process, abuse of the screening mechanism and insufficient humanitarian support to 
the claimants.  The problems are becoming more pressing, which have drawn 
tremendous attention from both public and private sectors.  In adherence to the 
overriding principle of safeguarding genuine claimants, the Government inevitably 
has to take initiative to formulate and introduce suitable policy choice so that the 
problems led by fake claimants and abuse of screening mechanism could be properly 
addressed.
Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice
In order to achieve the objective of this project, the following research questions are 
addressed:
1. What range of policies and tools could the HKSAR Government adopt to 
administer asylum seekers?
2. What particular policies and tools has the Government adopted in this regard –
and, why?
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3. How could the Government's policies and tools be improved and/or 
complemented by the adoption of other potentially more effective policies and 
tools in the light of experience to-date and also of the experience of other 
countries?
This project aims to find out practical and appropriate policy choices for the 
Government to administer NRCs in Hong Kong.  However, before conclusive 
recommendations could be made, it is important to first study the pros and cons of 
policies adopted over the history and identify socio-political changes from past to 
present, and then formulate the most suitable policies to cope with current situation 
with reference to previous experience and overseas practices. 
The above three questions are not straightforward at all, which require high level of 
research and analysis. Through figuring out answers for the first two questions, a 
thorough study on the problems, strategies and political forces in relation to refugee / 
NRCs handling in different eras is required, coupled with in-depth research on the 
rationales behind.  The study is supported with extensive data and evidence collected 
from various stakeholders facing the issues of the refugee handling and from materials 
in open sources around the world.  Feasible policy choices are to be analysed and 
evaluated in this project by means of a tailor-made analytical framework covering the 
governance, policy dynamics and policy tools of punitive and supportive in nature. 
Subsequent to a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of possible policy choices, 
several policy tools believed to be the most practical and appropriate will be set out so 
as to address the third research questions. 
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Overview of the Analytical Framework
In analysing policy processes, including that involving the administration of asylum 
seekers, there are at least three interrelated aspects of importance: the governance 
arrangements concerning how policies are initiated, regulated and sustained; the 
reasons for, and dynamics involved in, the adoption of particular policies; and actions
taken through the use of various policy tools. These aspects, considered together, 
establish the analytical framework of the project, as set out in Chapter 2. The 
framework provides a systematic method to analyse how policies on asylum seeker 
have been shaped and administered in Hong Kong.
Firstly, in respect of the governance arrangements, the modes and types of governance 
are under direct influence by the nature of policy, legal and regulatory framework, 
socio-political environment, and power of the public. The modes and types of 
different governance evolving in different regimes over the history of Hong Kong will 
be discussed by making reference to the theory of Knill and Tosun (2012). Secondly, 
policy dynamics comprising of different forces to drive the policy making will be 
analysed in order to determine the easiest and best timing when the policy window 
widely opens to introduce planned policy. Kingdon’s (2003) three-stream theory 
will be applied to study the three kinds of dynamics, namely policy, problem and 
political forces.  Lastly, all policies are realized through the employment of various 
policy tools.  Works of Elmore and McDonnel (1987) are then used to categorize 
policy tools into 4 types, i.e. mandates, inducement, capacity building and system 
changing. To determine the success of policy tools employed, the three streams 
addressed by Kingdon (2003) as well as appropriate governance types mentioned by 
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Knill and Tosun (2012) are heavily depended upon. Supplementary to Elmore and 
McDonnel (1987), a responsive regulatory pyramid of support and sanction outlined 
by Braithwaite (2011) is incorporated in the policy tools framework in order to assess 
how and when the four types of policy tools could work together.
The above interrelated aspects establish an analytical framework which assists to 
explore the policy choices with a systematic method over different eras of Hong Kong.  
Based on the analytical findings, recommendation could be made to the Government 
to make right policy choices in administrating the NRCs under suitable regime. 
Research Methodology
The research of this project is based on a desk-and-computer research methodology, 
focusing on administration towards asylum seekers in Hong Kong as well as foreign 
countries as well as relevant factual figures and statistics.  As such, the primary 
sources of information and data are obtained from websites of the UN Refugee 
Agency and relevant government departments including the Immigration Department 
and Hong Kong Police Force, the official records of LegCo meetings and 
documentations from established committees handling the non-refoulement claims 
such as Human Right Committee, Duty Lawyer Service and Finance Committee etc.  
Those information and data are considered reliable and accurate in nature as they are 
formally scrutinized by the Administration and LegCo members, reflecting the factual 
situation and opinions of the public and other stakeholders.   In particular, the 
LegCo members are representing the community, who would canvass views from the 
public and their constituencies.  Therefore, the questions and arguments raised by the 
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LegCo members during the Council meeting are to certain extent showing the 
concerns, interests and expectations of the general public. 
With regard to the legal aspect of the refugee matters, reference has been taken from 
the Bill of Rights, CAT Conventions, Immigration Ordinance, court rulings as well as 
other regulatory policies.  The development of the regulatory and legislative 
framework enhances the Government’s capability in administering and governing the 
non-refoulement claims, and meanwhile, provides better protection on the rights of 
the genuine claimants from inhumane treatment.   The experience and evaluation in 
dealing with the refugee matters over the decades have definitely given an insight on 
how to cope with the challenges in the future. 
In addition, this research also takes reference from secondary sources from 
newspapers, TV programmes, articles, books, and related reviews on this topical issue.  
Those secondary sources especially serve as strong indication of the public concern.  
On the other hand, through the news reports, editorials or press interviews, the 
claimants express their views on the current policies adopted by the Government at a 
different way.  With such massive information, the research analysis becomes more 
comprehensive, thorough and convincing. 
It has once been considered to approach NRCs pending screening assessment and 
related NGOs to have interview or surveys in order to have first-hand understanding 
about the problems encountered by NRCs, and to have more insights on what kind of 
policy tools could accommodate their living in Hong Kong.  Nonetheless, it is 
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considered impractical to invite suitable interviewees who are in position to give 
unbiased and impartial comments on the current situations of NRCs in Hong Kong.
Lastly, this project also took reference from overseas practices adopted by Germany 
Australia and UK in managing the refugee.  Analysis was then made on whether 
those practices are suitable and applicable to be introduced into Hong Kong context.  
The official departmental websites of the countries are the main source of 
information.
Chapter Outline
This report consists of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter which 
covers the focus, objectives and background of this project, research questions, 
overview of analytical framework and research methodology. 
In Chapter 2, an analytical framework was derived from literature review and 
academic studies on four traditional theories.  The framework was set out to address 
and analyze several crucial factors determining the success of a policy, including 
governance, policy dynamics and policy tools.  Those factors in policy making 
process are tightly correlating with each other.  The analytical framework was 
applied to conduct an empirical analysis on the policy choices adopted from the past 
to the future along different chapters of this project.
Administration and policies in handling asylum seekers have been evolving over the 
history.  Meanwhile, new conventions, bills and legislations are developed and 
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amended from time to time to cope with the ever-changing situations.  UNCHUR 
has introduced guidelines to make sure the refugees are duly protected throughout the 
world and is also keeping a close eye on the treatment towards the refugees by 
different countries. Chapter 3 briefly illustrates all the evolution and development 
regarding refugee handling in Hong Kong with a timeline of critical incidents, and 
concludes with a comprehensive empirical analysis on the policies adopted along the 
timeline. Whilst, Chapter 4 outlines the introduction and development of all relevant 
conventions and court rulings on refugee handling in Hong Kong, and the response 
given by the Government towards those conventions and rulings. 
Chapter 5 addresses the current situation of NRCs and social problems stemmed from 
the claimants.  On the other hands, the grievances from the claimants pending 
determination of the screening process have been included in this chapter.  To 
conclude, an empirical analysis was applied to evaluate the current policies to tackle 
the challenges, which provides an overview on how the Government could improve 
the situation. 
By reviewing the practices adopted by Germany, Australia and UK, Chapter 6 
evaluates whether those foreign practices were suitable to Hong Kong under full 
assessment of the socio-political environment, culture, legal system and population of 
refugee in Hong Kong.  
Through extensive and thorough analysis and assessment on various policy choices, a 
set of policy tools were recommended to the HKSAR Government in the last chapter, 
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coupled with recommendations on how the Government could accommodate the 
implementation of the policy proposals. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Nowadays public administrators and policymakers face an ever-changing, dynamic 
and diversified environment and thus are greatly influenced by multi-faceted factors 
in designing and implementing policies and actions to administer different issues, as 
well as reviewing their appropriateness and effectiveness.  The issues of asylum 
seekers in Hong Kong are becoming increasingly sophisticated and there are rising 
concerns and heated debates from the public and numerous stakeholders about those 
policies adopted by the Government in administration of asylum seekers.  
In this regard, this project intends to study various interrelated aspects to establish a 
comprehensive analytical framework in order to analyse systematically how 
government administer asylum seekers by initiating, regulating and sustaining
appropriate policies and action in Hong Kong.  This chapter outlines the analytical 
framework established for this project and discuss relevant theories, concepts and 
models in details.  
In drawing up analytical lens in the framework, this project identifies the most 
important interconnected aspects to study policy process, i.e. the governance
arrangements concerning how policies are initiated, regulated and sustained; the 
reasons for, and dynamics involved in, the adoption of particular policies; and actions
taken through the use of various policy tools.
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Firstly, this project reviews mode and type of governance along the historical timeline 
for the public and private sectors in handling particular social issue or affairs, i.e. 
administering asylum seekers in this project.  In initiating government policies, 
policymakers should take into account the governance arrangement previously and 
currently in effect which affect respective roles of public and private sectors, their 
relationships and respective powers, the existing institutional and political structure as 
well as degree of legal obligation. Reference is made to the work of Knill and 
Tosun (2012) to identify the type and mode of governance in order to study the level 
of government intervention as well as degree of cooperation and interaction between 
public and private sectors in administering asylum seekers.
Based upon understanding about the appropriate governance arrangement and its 
influence, the public administrators could be able to initiate the agenda setting phase 
and to create / identify a policy window by evaluating the reasons for, and dynamics 
involved in, the adoption of particular policies.  This framework will study policy 
dynamics in three different aspects, i.e. problem, policy and political streams using 
theory of Kingdon (2003).  Focuses are put upon recognizing specific problems and 
their nature (problem stream), preparing feasible and acceptable policy proposals 
(policy stream), and determining the political feasibility of a policy proposal by 
balancing the forces and concerns of actors from different political spectrum (politics 
stream).
After analyzing the governance arrangement and policy dynamics in adoption of 
particular policies by the Government in administration of asylum seekers, the 
framework will look into available policy tools and instruments which could be 
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applied by policymakers to deal with a particular policy problem.  Policymakers
need to take into account diverse means and limited resources such as law and 
regulation, money, goods and services, manpower, culture of the society as well as 
competencies of the public and private sectors, in short and long run in policy 
formation and implementation.  As such, administering asylum seekers is a gradual
and long-term process and policymakers should assess the circumstances and context,
behaviour and culture of those being regulated or administered before rushing to a 
monotype of policy tools.   Theory of McDonnell & Elmore (1987) is applied in this 
framework to categorize different policy tools into mandates, inducement, capacity 
building and system changing to be adopted by the government, and to assess their 
implication and effectiveness to administer asylum seekers.
In administrating and regulating a policy issue, ranges of policy tools in nature of 
support could be considered in the first place with the aim of build strengths upon the 
foundation of the system and the society as a whole.  Policy tools in nature of 
sanction should be considered in case the policy problems could not be resolved 
solely by tools to support.  Responsive regulatory pyramids outlined by Braithwaite 
(2011) will be applied to complement theory of McDonnell & Elmore (1987) with a 
view to structuring a comprehensive plan of policy tools and plans in administering 
asylum seekers.
Figure 2.1 presents the interlocking components of analytical framework applied in 
the study on administering asylum seekers in Hong Kong.  Details of each theories 
and models are illustrated and elaborated in details in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 1.1: Components of Analytical Framework
Types of Governance
Definitions
Despite no generally agreed definition of “Governance” in literatures, governance can 
generally be referred to structure of government, networking between the government 
and the individuals or private sectors, or process adopted by government to achieve 
various policy goals.  Amongst various literatures, Knill and Tosun (2012) has 
clearly addressed that “governance refers to the collective settlement of social affairs 
in a polity, including a broad range of different modes, such as hierarchical 
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intervention and non-hierarchical steering, based on cooperation between public and 
private actors or patterns of private self-governance.”
As stated by Knill and Tosun (2012), four ideal types of governance have been 
developed based on two dimensions i.e. the degree of cooperation between public and 
private actors, and the degree of legal obligation. The four types of governance 
could also be regarded as a combination of the three governance modes i.e. “hierarchy, 
markets and networks”. In brief, the hierarchy mode of governance stresses on 
setting formal rules and procedures to govern both public and private actors.  Public 
and private actors are having an asymmetrical relationship since the government is the 
ultimate policy maker formulating legal framework to force, in particular the private 
actors to comply with the public policy.  The opposing model to hierarchical 
governance is market governance where the market participants without the 
intervention by the government allocate and trade their resources efficiently based on 
price given an assumption that the participants are all rational.  In network 
governance mode, the interdependent public and private actors have informal 
interaction among each other and have better understanding of their own right so that 
their distinctive but interdependent goals could be achieved.
Table 2.1 summarizes the distinction between the four ideal types of governance, in 
terms of degrees of legal obligation and public-private cooperation, incorporated with 
three governance modes.
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Table 2.1  Types of Governance
Cooperation between public and private actors
Legal 
Obligation
High Low
High Regulated self-governance
(Hierarchy & Market modes)
Interventionist governance
(Hierarchy mode)
Low Cooperative governance
(Market & Network modes)
Private self-governance
(Market mode)
Source: adapted from Knill & Tosun (2012) 
Interventionist Governance
The first type of governance, “interventionist governance” decentralizes the 
governance capacity of the private sectors.  The government has a sanctioning power 
which far exceeds the power of the private actors, which causes the relationship 
between public and private sectors becoming hierarchical. The government intervenes 
under top-down approach into society through defining rules and regulations to bind 
over both the public and private actors involved.  Under this model, “command and 
control” approach is adopted by the government in policy making and implementation.
The hierarchy mode has been dominating in interventionist governance over the 
market and network modes.  Therefore, under this type of governance, the 
government tends to generate fair conditions for both public and private actors to 
supply common goods under a reliable framework with a view to sustaining economic 
activities.  
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Regulated Self-governance
The second type is “regulated self-governance”, under which hierarchical intervention 
through legally binding rules is adopted by the Government during the formulation 
and implementation of public policies.  Different from interventionist governance, 
the Government would have closer cooperation and interaction with public and 
private actors, which is a typical mixture of hierarchy and market modes.  This type 
of governance highly relies on the markets and involves more participation of the 
society in formalized and institutionalized procedures.  The private actors are 
empowered in various forms by the government but the final decision on policy 
contents and regulatory arrangements are still controlled by the government.  The 
government is undertaking “shadow of hierarchy”, and is capable to intervene 
whenever any governance failures.  
Cooperative Governance
The third type of governance is “cooperative governance”, which is a mixture of 
market and network modes.  The private actors play more proactive and dominant 
role than the government in policy formulation and implementation.  The rules and 
regulations are established and developed through negotiation and voluntary 
agreements by the markets instead of legal binding and obligation.  During the 
negotiation process, a wide range of public and private actors are taking part in, and 
such “joint policy making” has replaced the hierarchical intervention with voluntary 
agreements by the actors. Mutual trust and complementarity of resources within the 
network are of utmost importance.  The government is, in principle, just responsible 
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for working closely with those actors and offering valuable resources to support the 
policy making and implementation. 
Private Self-governance
The remaining type of governance, “private self-governance” is another extreme type 
of governance opposite to interventionist government where the markets are playing a 
dominant role in this governance type. The market participants tend to weigh their 
individual benefit more than the society’s welfare, causing negative externalities.  As 
a result, basic requirements have to be constituted to ensure the functioning of the 
markets.  However, the cooperation between state and society is very close during 
the process of defining and implementing public policies, but the decision making is 
completely in control by the markets.  Similar to cooperative governance, private 
self-governance is based on voluntary agreements among actors rather than legal 
obligation.  However, the autonomy on decision making of private self-governance 
is far higher than that of cooperative governance.  The government may only make 
contribution in providing complementary governance or act as facilitator to enhance 
the legitimacy of private governance and resolve the conflict between interest groups. 
Influence of Governance in Agenda Setting
Institutional and political context are the key factors determining which type of 
governance is the most appropriate to be adopted.  For example, interventionist 
governance or regulated self-governance are the most appropriate approaches to 
address political problems if institutional constellations enjoy high governmental 
governance capacity but weak societal capacity.  In the case of “weak government, 
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strong society” scenario, private self-governance or cooperative governance are 
definitely a better options. 
With a variety of institutional and political context, different countries and policy 
sectors may adopt different modes of governance or develop various types of 
governance composed of a mixture or spectrum of the aforesaid governance modes. 
In policy setting process, different type of governance, which has different level of 
legal obligation and degree of cooperation between public and private sector, has
significant influence upon policymakers to determine how and when policies could be 
initiated, regulated and sustained and types of policy tools are to be adopted.
Problem, Policy and Political Dynamics
Based upon understanding about the appropriate governance arrangement,
policymakers could be able to initiate the agenda setting phase and to create / identify 
a policy window by evaluating the reasons for, and dynamics involved in, the 
adoption of particular policies.  According to Kingdon (2003), agenda setting is the 
first step in the policy process and the policy agenda is the list of issues or problems 
to which government officials pay serious attention. This theory focuses on the 
agenda-setting phase of the policy process and takes into account different processes 
at work and the politics of policy processes, which are described as “three streams” –
the problem stream, the policy stream and the political stream.  The three streams 
explain the drives necessary to place an issue on the public policy agenda by uplifting 
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the government agenda to decision agenda and ultimately for a change of public 
policy.
Theory of Kingdon (2003) focuses upon studying specific problems and their nature 
(problem stream), preparing feasible and acceptable policy proposals (policy stream), 
and determining the political feasibility of a policy proposal by balancing the forces 
and concerns of actors from different political spectrum (politics stream).
Figure 2.2 Three Streams Model for Analyzing the Policy Process
Source: Adapted from Kingdon (2003)
Problem Stream 
The problems stream concerns about recognition of problem and process of 
persuading policy decision makers to pay attention to one specific problem among 
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various ones. A policy issue would not be regarded as a problem until it could 
attract attention from mainstream media, members of the public and persons with 
political influence including legislative councilors who recognize the existence of a 
problem and reckon that remedial actions are required. For instance, influx of 
Vietnamese refugee had been identified as problem a few decades ago as it adversely 
affected the social order and security and caused other major problems which aroused 
the concern of the general public. On the other hand, attention of government or the 
authority should be properly sought in order to place the problem recognized on top of 
the government policy agenda.  If the problem is not duly bought up to an 
appropriate level, the government may consider that existing actions are able to tackle
the problem, or may fail to probably address the problem.
Policy Stream 
Policy stream represents the process by which policy proposals are generated, debated, 
revised, and adopted for consideration by policymakers (Kingdon, 2003). It is a 
process for policymakers to select appropriate policy initiatives to resolve a problem.  
In doing the selection, policymakers should take into account the feasibility of all 
policies in term of technical feasibility, resource constraint, predominant social 
values… etc.
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Political Stream 
According to Kingdon (2003), political stream is political factor that influence policy 
agendas, such as changes in elected officials, political climate or mood and voices of 
advocacy or opposition groups. Change in elected officials refers to turnover of key 
personnel after change of administration, which is considered as a prime time for 
change in policy agenda. Also, any political deliberation or disputes between the 
administrators and politicians may affect the progress in policy making and alteration.
Voices of advocates and opposition groups usually create as much noise as they can in 
order to arouse the attention from the government and to gain opportunity to bargain. 
National mood or “a general social trend” represents common values or ideas 
possessed by majority of people in the society. It is common for government to take 
sample surveys from the mass public in order to discern or gauge the popular 
reference that made up national mood or climate in the community. 
Policy Window 
The three streams describe important factors in the policy making process and the 
model essentially describes the interrelationship between various streams.  For 
agenda setting to be successful, at least two streams should converge at a critical 
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moment to open a “policy window”.  The open of policy window offers 
opportunities for advocates to frame their proposal, to attract attention and arouse 
attention of government officials and other stakeholders with political influence.  
There are also occasions during with an existing problem deteriorates which creates
chance for advocates to promote their solutions. 
Policy window may open unpredictably and sometimes within a short period of time.  
The window may close shortly because of (i) feeling of the government that problem 
has already been solved, (ii) failing to take action, (iii) change of important personnel, 
(iv) pass of focusing events, or (v) absence of available alternatives (Kingdon, 1984).
It is vital for policymakers to recognize important elements in three streams, to grasp 
the opportunity when policy window opens and to place their policy proposal firmly 
on the top of the government agenda.
Categorization of Policy Tools
After analyzing the three streams policy dynamics in adoption of particular policies, 
the policymakers would look into all available options to determine the most desirable 
and feasible policy as solutions to the problem in the existing governance arrangement.  
Due to different interests and values, policymakers usually had a preference on how 
or when they should react to the problem. They would design or choose policies with 
a view to accomplish an outcome, mostly likely to induce changes in the behaviour of 
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the target, with the available resources and the constraints such as law and regulation, 
money, goods and services, manpower, culture of the society as well as competencies 
of the public and private sectors. McDonnell & Elmore (1987) call these policy 
tools and instruments as “authoritative choice of means to accomplish a purpose” and 
they are categorized into “mandates, inducements, capacity-building and system
changing” which had their respective goals, assumptions, characteristics and costs for 
implementation.
Mandates are rules governing the actions of individuals and agencies. It seeks the 
compliance or consistent behaviour of the targets by coercion. In setting up the rules, 
policymakers should make sure that the targets were capable of following the rules, 
sufficient information was stated, which is most likely the minimum standard, and the 
frequency of the occurrence of the desired or undesired action would change in 
accordance to the level of tolerance accepted. 
Inducement refers to the transfer of money to individuals or agencies in return for the 
production of goods or services. Usually, money is granted under the condition that 
the individuals or agencies would produce certain stated values. Policymakers should 
be aware of the capacity and the preferences or values of the implementing agencies. 
Their capacity and preferences could severely affect the effectiveness and the 
outcome of the policy. If the implementing agencies have not got the required 
personnel, expertise or authority, they could not accomplish the goal effectively or 
they could only reach the minimum standard or they could not even accomplish 
anything planned. The main costs of this policy tool are the inducement itself as well 
as the cost to oversight.
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Capacity building is the transfer of money to individuals or agencies for the purpose 
of investment in future benefits such as material, intellectual or human resources. 
Capacity building is always a long term investments when the individuals or 
institutions fail to perform. By investing into those future benefits, the targeted 
outcome is the improvement in the competency of the institution or individuals of 
concern. Since capacity building looks into some future outcomes, the results are, 
most of the time, uncertain, intangible and immeasurable. Due to this reason, it may 
be difficult to gain the support of the policymakers and the society to agree to the 
investment at first. 
System changing is the transfer of official authority among individuals and agencies 
involving changes in the institutional structure. System changing aims at increasing 
the efficiency of the services and provision of goods and redistributing the authority 
and thus the political power in the existing system. Such transfer of authority may 
cause the creation of a new agency or the dissolution of an agency. Granting 
authorities to agencies usually require the granting of respective resources for the 
provision of service. New authority always comes together with new responsibility. It 
is necessary for the government to ensure that the agency was capable for the new 
responsibility and that the new mandates were taken seriously, properly and 
effectively
All the four types of policy tools may have something in common. However, they are 
different primarily on the resources to be employed. Which are law, money and 
authority, and on the aim of such employment, short term provision of services and 
goods of inducement versus long term investment of competency in capacity building. 
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In occasions, policymakers may only employ one of the four tools while in other 
occasions they may employ more than one tool to attain their goals. Sometimes they 
use one tool complemented by the others or, sometimes, they may need a few tools 
working together to give a desired outcome. It would be worth looking into the 
possible way of a policymaker to formulate a set of policy tools so that policies could 
be realised.
Regulatory Pyramids – Support and Sanction
It is a continual and long-term process to adopt a set of policies to resolve a 
complicated problem such as administering asylum seekers.  In adopting and 
implementing policy tools and instruments, policymakers should assess the 
circumstances and context, behaviour and culture of those being regulated or 
administered before rushing to adopting a basket of monotype policy tools
simultaneously.   It is necessary to study how, when and whether could mandates or 
sanction, inducement and capacity building work together such that policymakers 
could achieve optimal result.  Moreover, in a diverse society nowadays, it is 
important for policymakers to liaise with whom they are administering before 
designing and taking actions to regulate and rectify the deficiency and inefficiency in 
the society. In this regard, the regulatory framework of Braithwaite (2011) will be 
applied to supplement this analytical framework in adopting potentially more 
effective policies and tools in administering asylum seekers.
The responsive regulatory theory started out as a theory for business regulation in the 
1980s focusing upon how regulators who did their jobs well achieve positive results.  
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It has been evolved over the years and is now applied in crime prevention, peace 
building and a wide range of different public and private governance applications.
The theory also emphasized that policymakers or regulator should consider ranges of 
policy tools in nature of support in the first place with the aim of build strengths upon 
the foundation of the system and the society as a whole.  Policy tools in nature of 
sanction should only be resorted to if the policy problems could not be resolved.  
Regulatory Pyramids
Braithwaite (2011)’s responsive regulatory theory outlined responsive regulatory 
pyramids, i.e. the pyramid of supports and the pyramid of sanctions and introduce the 
gradual process the policymakers should employ by utilising capacity building, 
inducement and, lastly, mandate one by one to construct a set of policy tools. Its crux 
is that by having a capability to escalate to tough enforcement, administrators would 
first take actions to build strengths based on collaborative capacity building and to 
reward positive behaviour and contributions.  A public or private regulator should 
not rush to law enforcement solutions to resolve the problem before considering and 
exploring a range of approaches that support capacity building.  Policymakers could
seek to use one strategy after another that might further build strengths on a 
foundation by moving up from the lower levels of the pyramid.  
On the other hand, Braithwaite (2011) stated that if escalating actions in the support 
pyramid failed to solve specific problems sufficiently, policymakers should resort to 
the pyramid of sanction.  Other than the exceptional circumstances which require 
immediate intervention and stringent enforcement, policymakers should first use 
restorative and dialogue-based approach at the base of the pyramid of sanctions to 
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ensure compliance and improvement by regulated actors.  If regulated actors still 
show persistent defiance, regulators would resort to moving up in the sanction 
pyramid to take increasingly demanding intervention and punitive approaches, from 
shame, sanctions, prosecutions and punishment to incapacitation. 
The theory of Braithwaite (2011) also stipulates that both pyramids of supports and 
sanctions could be used simultaneously or interchangeably, i.e. policymakers might 
use sanctions pyramid to insert pressure on the regulated actors to ensure compliance 
while at the same time recognized the good performance and measures of the 
regulated actors.  This practice could avoid stigmatizing respective actors unfairly.
In this project, responsive regulatory framework is used to study how, when and 
whether could various policy tools which were categorized as mandates or sanction, 
inducement and capacity building could work together and used simultaneously and 
interchangeably in the pyramids of supports and sanctions in a collaborative manner.  
The framework could assist the policymakers in prioritizing various policy tools and 
to construct a comprehensive policy plans.
Concluding Comments
This project put together theory of Knill and Tosun about mode of governance, 
three-streams model of Kingdon and McDonnell & Elmore’s theory in categorizations
of policy tools as skeleton in establishing an analytical framework, which is 
supplemented by Braithwaite’s theory of responsive regulatory pyramids prioritizing 
various policy tools and to construct a comprehensive policy plans.
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In this connection, this analytical framework provides a structured and systematic 
methodology in analyzing three interrelated and important aspects in policy processes
of administering asylum seekers in Hong Kong, i.e. the governance arrangements 
concerning how policies are initiated, regulated and sustained; the reasons for, and 
dynamics involved in, the adoption of particular policies; and actions taken through 
the use of various policy tools.
To sum up, this framework sets a foundation to guide the empirical analysis in the 
following chapters. Detailed studies would be conducted conducted upon the 
governance, policy dynamics and policy tools of Hong Kong in administering asylum 
seekers alone the historical timeline. Based upon these findings, a comprehensive 
analysis will be made on the recent situation in Hong Kong as well as overseas
practices to explore appropriate policy tools to administer the asylum seekers.
By applying this framework with extensive and thorough analysis and assessment, 
this project will make recommendations to the Government about an appropriate set 
of policy tools and policy proposals with a view to better administering asylum 
seekers in Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER THREE: ADMINISTERING ASYLUM 
SEEKERS – VIETNAMESE REFUGEES
Introduction
Hong Kong has a long history in dealing with the refugee issue, notably the 
Vietnamese refugee issue which started in 1975 when the first batch of 3745 
Vietnamese refugees (VRs) arrived Hong Kong. These VRs fled from persecution 
by the communist regime after the Vietnamese war ended. Hong Kong soon became 
one of the destinations of VRs. The issue lasted in Hong Kong for 25 years and 
officially came to an end in 2000. During this period, the HK government had taken 
various policies and measures, within its own capability, according to the then 
situations practically and politically.
Vietnamese Refugee Issue (1975-1979)
Significant developments before the 1979 International conference on Indochinese 
refugees
Before the 1979 International conference on Indochinese refugee held in Geneva, the 
HK government simply reacted to the fast changing situation. Initially in 1975, the 
HK government, on humanitarian grounds, temporarily accommodated these refugees
in open camps established by the army. These camps were operated and basic needs 
were met by the HK government while other voluntary agencies and United Nation 
High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR) also contributed for additional needs and
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care. At the same time, the HK government negotiated with foreign governments for 
the resettlement of those VRs. The resettlement offers were mainly from Canada, 
USA, Australia and France. (Hong Kong Legislative Council (Legco), 1975)
From 1975 to 1976, resettlement of VRs was fast and smooth. Since 1976, Hong 
Kong had employed the port of first call policy. Some of the refugees who have 
relatives in Hong Kong were allowed to settle here for family reunion purpose
(Legco, 1975). In 1978, the arrival of VRs increased vigorously. The then HK
government reached an agreement with the UNHCR to provide temporary 
accommodation to the VRs arriving Hong Kong against a guarantee from UNHCR to 
arrange for resettlement of VRs as soon as possible. In the same year, the HK 
government had, in collaboration with voluntary agencies, opened a camp in the urban 
area (Hughes & Kristen Grim, 1985). 
In late 1978, the HK government discerned that a series of arrivals from vessels
involving refugee business or human trafficking activities. The HK government 
amended the Merchant Shipping Ordinance and the Immigration Ordinance promptly 
in January 1979 with a view to stopping the abuse of the provision of temporary 
asylum by imposing sanction (Legco, 1979).
In this period, VRs in Hong Kong were not imposed any condition of stay. They were 
allowed to take up employment and walk freely in Hong Kong. VRs were regarded as 
a source of low-cost labour and required less assistance by allowing them to work. 
This is a type of inducement for local resident to accept temporary asylum in Hong 
Kong (Hughes & Kristen Grim, 1985).
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The 1979 International Conference on Indo-Chinese refugee
The exodus of Vietnamese peaked in the first half of 1979. In mid-1979, some Asian 
countries warned that they have reached the limit to accept more refugees. The 
international conference on Indo-Chinese refugee was held in Geneva (UNHCR,
2000). Hong Kong was represented by its then sovereignty, the British and agreement 
was made in the conference by the participants. Mrs. Rita Fan summed up precisely 
part of the agreement “The first asylum countries, mainly Hong Kong, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, would accept all refugees landing on their 
shore; they would not tow their boats to the sea and they would not refuse them 
sanctuary. ….” (Legco, 1987).
Governance Mode in Relation to the Issue
The refugee issue was a brand new issue to the then government. The government had 
no policy or legislation with reference to the issue. The Hong Kong government took 
the initiative to deal with the issue while UNHCR and voluntary agencies had more 
significant roles, by contributions in various ways, in the issue as time went by. The 
policy of the government slowly formed. UNHCR collaborated with the local 
government, adhered to the local policies and sought the consent of the authority to 
accommodate the refugees temporarily. The UNHCR and various voluntary agencies 
played a supporting role to implement the government policy. The HK government 
took a leading and dominant role in the issue which had all the power to implement 
different policies and to employ different tools. The issue was dealt with under a 
mode of regulated self-governance.
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Policy Dynamics in Relation to the Issue
Problem arose when refugees continued arriving Hong Kong. There was very little 
debate in the legislative council in relation to the issue. More importantly, the local 
people had no strong objection to help the refugees and allowed them to wait in Hong 
Kong for resettlement although concerns and discontent was seen within the public in 
1979. In a newspaper commentary in 1978, the commenter showed concerns on the 
issue but did recognize the need to help the VRs on humanitarian grounds (Kung 
Sheung Evening News, 1978). Since a regulated self-governance mode was employed
by the government, voluntary agencies had little power and authority to change the 
government policyt. That is to say, problem stream issues dominantly opened up the 
policy window for the government to handle the issue.
Policy Tools Employed in the Early Development of the Refugee Issue
Without political resistance, the government had the power to deal with the problems 
on its own. In 1979, to avoid the abuse of the policy and facilities offered to the 
refugees, laws were enacted to regulate the behavior of the related actors. The Civil 
Aid Service and Social Welfare department were deployed to manage the camps and 
deliver basic needs initially which involved the allocation of a new authority and 
resources to these two agents for such provisions. Lawful employment of the VRs 
was indirectly a kind of inducement to VRs, the public and the employers, at that time. 
The HK government had in fact applied various types of policy tools such as 
Mandates, System Changing and Inducement.
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Open Camp Policy (1979-1982)
Government policy
After the 1979 Geneva conference, Hong Kong was obliged to act as a place of first 
asylum. No major change in policy was taken place since Hong Kong had taken up 
the role since 1976. All new arrivals were automatically regarded as refugees. By then, 
parts of the open camps were managed by the government and the others by UNHCR. 
UNHCR funded these camps and employed voluntary agencies to manage the camps.
The HK government, at the meantime, continued to modify its refugee policies. It 
enacted new laws or amended existing laws. For example, the Hong Kong 
government amended the law to impose conditions on refugees to prohibit them from 
rejecting resettlement offers without reasonable excuse. It had also negotiated with 
foreign countries to promote resettlement opportunities and opened and relocated 
refugee camps (Legco, 1981).
In 1980, the local government tightened the immigration control to Mainland Chinese
illegal immigrants. It changed its “touch base” policy to the “repatriation upon arrest” 
policy and prohibited employment of IIs (Legco, 1980). The decision had hindered 
Mainlanders from reunion with their families in Hong Kong. The policy dynamics of 
the refugee issue was seriously influenced in political aspect and was a factor for a 
subsequent implementation of the close camp policy.
Development of the Vietnamese Refugee issue (1982)
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The arrival rate of refugees in Hong Kong dropped after the 1979 Geneva conference. 
Resettlement rate increased initially in 1979 and gradually reduced afterwards. The 
resettlement countries adopted more restrictive criteria in choosing who to offer 
resettlement and reduced the resettlement quota in 1981. As resettlement 
opportunity of the VRs diminished significantly, VRs stranded in Hong Kong for an 
extended period which became main root cause of refugee related social problem in 
later stage (Legco, 1982a).
In 1982, continuous arrivals of VRs, with majority believed to be merely economic 
migrants, had already obsessed the countries of first asylum. Both resettlement 
countries and places of first asylum take measures to deter Vietnamese boat people 
(VBP) from entering their country, known as humane deterrence (Ta Kung Pao, 1982).
Hong Kong became the only place to accommodate all refugees arrived in camps 
without any condition of stay imposed. As a result, Hong Kong was an attractive 
destination to VRs. Together with the inability to resettle the refugees, problem arose 
later (Legco, 1982a).
Disturbance Inside Open Camp
In addition to the above problems, gang fights and disturbances in the Kai Tak open 
camp pushed the public sentiment to a the highest level (Kung Sheung Evening News, 
1982). The local government swiftly prosecuted the instigators, reviewed the 
management of the camps and maintained law and order within the camp. 
Subsequently, the contract terms of UNHCR with the voluntary agencies had to be 
refined. Nonetheless, the mounting public concern on public security causes a 
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change in policy dynamic in political aspect again (Legco, 1982b).
The Closed Camp Policy (1982-1988)
Difficulties encountered by Hong Kong
Hong Kong has dense population and had insufficient space to take in VRs endlessly. 
Economy was down turning with a high unemployment rate in 1982 and Hong Kong 
was left with limited resources in public spending. Continual influx and prolonged 
stay of VRs in Hong Kong further consumed resources and occupied scare land in 
Hong Kong (Legco, 1982a).
Actions of the Government
In order to administering VRs problem in Hong Kong, the local government 
considered various policy tools which included restriction of employment, setting up 
refugee camps outside Hong Kong, repatriation of refugees or towing away the 
arriving VBP in the sea (Ta Kung Pao, 1982). UNHCR was consulted on the 
alternatives. The HK government later leaned towards setting up closed camps after 
assessed the feasibility of each options. The above mentioned disturbances later 
prompted the local government to take action immediately. (Legco, 1982a)
Implementation of Closed Camp Policy
In 1982, the government decided to implement the closed camp policy. Relevant 
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legislations were made to set up closed camps, to appoint Correctional Services 
Department (CSD) to manage the closed camps and to authorise additional power to 
concerning departments. Any refugees arrived afterward would be confined within the 
closed camp (Legco, 1982a).  In the closed camps, refugees cannot seek employment 
outside or leave the camps. Facilities were provided inside camp to gratify their 
basic needs.  Education and trainings were arranged to prepare VRs for resettlement. 
VRs also had the opportunities to take piece works inside the camps. To Hong Kong 
people, the treatment of VRs inside closed camps is considered as humane enough 
(Legco, 1985).
The closed camp policy was an effective policy to deter VRs from coming to Hong 
Kong at initial stage. However, the closed camp policy never came to perfection. The 
local government kept reviewing the policy and adjusted the details of the policy to 
cope with the ever changing situation. The local government collaborated with 
UNHCR and voluntary agencies for an additional family life education program in 
1983 (Legco, 1983). It also improved facilities in the camps and brought in 
voluntary agencies to manage the camps after gangs fights in 1984 (Legco, 1984).  
In addition, facing criticisms from voluntary agencies within and outside Hong Kong,
the then HK government decided to adopt some recommendations derived from 
criticisms (Security Branch, 1986). For instance, the HK government improved the 
provision of education inside camps after comparing merits of four options and 
consulted UNHCR and other voluntary agencies (Security Branch, 1987).
Analysis of Closed Camp Policy
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The mandates of the local government and UNHCR were totally different. The first 
priority of the local government was to govern Hong Kong and take care of welfare of 
local residents. The main objective of the closed camp policy was to deter further 
influx of VRs. In contrast, UNHCR opposed to the closed camp policy and intended 
to protect and assist refugees (Rita Fan, 2004). The problem arose and public opinion
and sentiment forced the local government to implement the closed camp policy. In 
order not to damage international reputation of Hong Kong, the HK government
improved the policy on its own ways and abandoned suggestions from voluntary 
agencies. The cooperation between the government and UNHCR was still in place 
and strengthened. By and large, the mode of governance did not change. UNHCR and 
voluntary agencies were consulted, but their suggestions were not necessarily adopted. 
Under the mode of regulated self-governance, the local government continued its
leading role and acted as the final decision maker to policies. 
The policy dynamics in the enactment of the closed camp policy were much 
complicated when being compared to the previous policies. All the three streams, i.e. 
problem, political and policy stream contributed to opening of policy windows and 
the ultimate decisions. The problem stream issues discussed in the previous section 
had induced the government to consider a policy change. Politically, the tightening 
of the immigration policy on IIs was referred as an unfair treatment towards the 
Mainlanders. Local residents thus requested the government to stop accommodating 
VRs. Gang fights inside the open camps raised further public concern. Out of the four
options suggested, the HK government selected the closed camp policy after 
deliberation. Policy stream issues played a relative minor factor and a bigger role later 
in the improvement of closed camp policy. The problem stream issues had effectively 
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led to the opening of the policy window while the political stream issues acted as 
catalyst to implement the new policies efficiently.
When a particular policy has been adopted, relevant sets of policy tools were used to 
achieve its objectives. The closed camp policy involved legislation to grant authority 
to different government departments and to control the behaviour of the VRs. As an 
inducement, NGOs were engaged and brought into the closed camps to facilitate its
proper management. Tools of capacity building was also employed e.g. the training of 
teachers in camps. That is, all the four policy tools of Capacity Building, Mandates, 
Inducement and System Changing were employed.
Policy of Repatriation
Without significant progress in resolving the predicament of Hong Kong caused by 
the huge amount of boat people in short term, Executive Council of Hong Kong 
endorsed the policy of repatriation in 1985 (Security Branch, 1986). 
In 1986, more than half of the VBP came from North Vietnam were economic 
refugees but not political refugees. At the meantime, the main resettlement countries 
reduced their intake quota for VRs from Hong Kong drastically. It was envisioned 
that refugees in Hong Kong would be difficult to be resettled and stranded in closed 
camps. Against all odds, the Hong Kong government looked seriously into all feasible 
solutions, particularly repatriation and abolishment of the first asylum policy. 
(Security Branch, 1986).
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While the Hong Kong government considered the repatriation policy, screening 
procedure was recommended to ensure genuine refugees were not wrongly repatriated 
resulting in inhumane treatments. Both screening and repatriation required the 
collaboration and agreement of the British government and the Vietnamese authority. 
In 1986, Hong Kong government had no contact with the Vietnamese government, 
nor did the British government consider it as the right timing to negotiate with the 
Vietnamese authorities. In addition, UNHCR had clearly objected to such a 
screening policy towards the refugees (Security Branch, 1986).
Screening Policy: Commenced on 1988
Details of Screening Policy
In 1987, the predicament in Hong Kong was not relieved. Hong Kong became one 
of the very few places which still accommodate all newly arrived Vietnamese. To 
avoid attracting more VBP to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government turned down 
the request from UNHCR and NGOs to abolish closed camp policy. In the same 
year, the public have developed antipathy and resentment towards the VBP issue due 
to their unstoppable influx, the apparent unfair treatment towards Chinese IIs, 
financial burden and continuous stretching of resources of Hong Kong. The Mainland 
government continuously pressured the British government to solve the VBP issue in 
Hong Kong after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed (QS Yuan, 2015). As 
the British government was reluctant to offer resettlement or to contribute financially 
to the issue, it finally agreed to the proposed policy of repatriation of VBP in a 
humane way. 
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To implement such as repatriation policy, legislators in Hong Kong proposed a 
screening policy and introduced a set of new measures. All VBP were treated as IIs
upon arrival and were required to undergo a screening procedure. The procedure, 
designed in accordance with UNHCR guidelines, was conducted by ImmD and 
monitored by UNHCR. Those screened-out would be classified as IIs pending 
repatriation while the screened-in would be classified as refugees and be 
accommodated in refugee camps waiting for resettlement to a third country. Only 
basic facilities were provided in detention centres managed by CSD. Several closed 
camps were gradually liberalised to open camp after years which was managed by 
UNHCR (Security Branch, 1988).
Analysis of Screening Policy
The implementation of the policy was initiated by the HK government with the 
support of both British government and UNHCR. UNHCR had a more vital role in the 
policy design and implementation owing to monitoring from foreign countries.
Nevertheless, the local government still upheld the leading and dominating role and 
the mode of governance still remained as regulated self-governance.
The policy window was opened with a combination of issues in problem stream and 
political stream. The stretching of resources from Hong Kong, dense population and 
huge influx of VBP had imposed real difficulties to Hong Kong. The deterrence effect 
of closed camps had gradually vanished and the administration had shortage in 
manpower and resource to accommodate increasing number of VBP. Problem stream 
issue alone had overwhelming pressure for opening of policy window for HK 
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Government to implement new policy tools to tackle the issue.
In political aspect, the public resentment was noticeable. The support from UNHCR 
and the British government was the key for the screening policy whilst the refusal of 
the Vietnamese and British authority to negotiate on repatriation had shelved the 
alternative option at that time. The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the potential 
financial burden to Britain were catalysts for British government to give green light 
upon the screening and repatriation policy. On the other hand, the policy stream 
issue was not as prominent as the other two streams.  The policy choice of the HK 
government was limited and bounded by the requirement of the British government to 
act as place of first asylum,.
Similar to the implementation of the closed camp policy, screening policy also 
involved new legislations for the provision of detention. Rights and authorities were 
granted to officers of ImmD and CSD for screening and detention camp purpose. The 
employment of NGOs within camps was also a kind of inducement to better 
administer VRs. To sum up, the new screening policy also made use of policy tools 
of Mandates, Inducement and System Changing.
Repatriation of Vietnamese Boat People (1988 – 1999)
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)
In 1989, another international conference was held in Geneva in respect to the VBP
issue. Agreement was made in the conference, known as the CPA. The agreement 
-52-
endorsed that “If, after the passage of reasonable time, it becomes clear that voluntary 
repatriation is not making sufficient progress towards the desired objective, 
alternatives recognized as being acceptable under international practices would be 
examined (Legco,1989a).
CPA was carried out in accordance with the International Covenant on Human Rights. 
According to the CPA, UNHCR would make arrangements for resettlement for those 
Vietnamese who were screened in as refugees. VBP who were denied refugee status 
after screening would be repatriated to Vietnam. These procedures were subject to the 
scrutiny of UNHCR. If VBP were aggrieved at the decision on their status, they might 
lodge appeal through a proper channel.
Development of the Vietnamese Boat People Issue
The screening policy alone did not deter VBP from coming to Hong Kong. Although 
Hong Kong and British government had engaged the international community and 
gained the support to the screening policy, the negotiation with the Vietnamese 
authority regarding the repatriation of the screened-out did not succeed (Legco, 
1989b). The repatriation could finally be realised after the agreement of CPA. 
In October 1991, it was recorded that the number of VBP in Hong Kong peaked at 
64,300. In the early 1990s, the HK government commenced voluntary repatriation 
programme and was poorly received by the VBP despite an agreement reached with 
the Vietnamese government to prohibit any revenge against them upon their return to 
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Vietnam. Later, mandatory repatriation was enforced upon the agreement made by 
countries worldwide.
Broadcast of Updated Information in Detention Centres
According to the legislation paper on 11-03-1992, only a small amount of VBP were 
screened-in as refugees, i.e. 4 414 out of 31 682 VBP. Suggestion to broadcast a 
one-hour programme at detention centres daily was brought up with a view to
providing VBP with all kinds of important information and news so as to lure them to 
accept voluntary repatriation.
In order to promulgate to implementation of the Screening and Repatriation policy and 
dissuade the influx of VR, the Hong Kong government began to broadcast a 
Vietnamese radio announcement in the government funded radio, Radio Television 
Hong Kong. This was known as the Bắt đầu từ nay broadcast. This was an effective 
measure in assisting repatriation which is a considered as Inducement under the policy 
tool of Elmore and McDonnel.
Reception of VRs by British Government
During a CPA meeting in Bangkok in 1994, the HK government requests the British 
Government to consider accepting VRs in Hong Kong who had no family links
thereat. In return, only around 2 000 refugees from Hong Kong were resettled since 
then. With the reluctant attitude of the British government to accept more VR, its
effort to press other resettlement countries to accept VRs from Hong Kong was in 
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vain. Repatriation was literally the only way to resolve the predicament in Hong 
Kong.
Integration of Vietnamese refugee under Local Resettlement Scheme (2000)
Repatriation Situation
The resettlement figures were declining steadily from 1990 to 1999, dropping from 
7,600 to 70. Given the fact that many of them had no relatives abroad and a portion 
had drug addiction problem or criminal record, it became virtually impossible to 
resettle them.
HK Government has seriously explored other options, including resettlement in the 
Mainland, voluntary return to Vietnam, and even revocation of their refugee’s status, 
but none is feasible.
In 1999, the population at Pillar Point Vietnamese Refugee Centre (PPVRC) consists 
of about 600 VRs and 550 Vietnamese migrants (i.e. non-refugees). There were over 
400 moved out from the Pillar Point Centre to self-arranged accommodation.  They
were all employed and did not require any government assistances. As such, some 
refugees had gradually integrated into society.
Implementation of Local Resettlement Scheme
There was a group of VBP, who have stayed in Hong Kong for over 10 years, known 
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as “non-national” Vietnamese migrants. They neither had the opportunity to be 
resettled elsewhere nor chance to return to Vietnam. Integration to the Hong Kong 
community was the only viable humane solution. Then Secretary for Security Mrs 
Regina Ip said “allowing the problem to drag on would only aggravate the burden on 
Hong Kong…. Moreover, the existence of the PPVRC has created a host of problems 
such as drugs, violence and other crimes. It is also a stumbling block to our efforts to 
encourage VRs and Vietnamese migrants to lead a normal and self-reliant life".
In February 2000, the HK government announced that it would widen the Local 
Resettlement Scheme for Vietnamese Migrants. The Scheme was introduced in 1986 
to provide an opportunity for a limited number of VRs to settle in Hong Kong. Under 
the widened scheme, all 973 VRs stranded in Hong Kong, 327 Vietnamese migrants
and their 108 families were eligible to apply for settlement here. Successful applicants 
would be allowed to settle in Hong Kong.
Analysis of Local Resettlement Programme
In gist, the major issues encountered in dealing with the VBP were the riots, the 
commission of crimes and enormous expenditure. The HK Government had adopted 
the policy tool of “Mandate” and amended the Immigration Ordinance in order to 
integrate the last batch of VRs and the VBP in Hong Kong via the Local Resettlement 
Programme. With the unprecedented scheme launched for non-Chinese immigrants, 
those Vietnamese were issued with Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card in which 
they were allowed to work legally in Hong Kong. They were granted permanent 
residency and the eligibility to apply for Hong Kong travel document. The HK 
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government regarded that it was the last but the only option to tackle and end the 
problem.
Problems Caused
According to the Official Record of proceedings of Legislative Council on 30 June 
1999, Legislative Councilor Mr. Ambrose Cheung mentioned that there was a riot 
broke out in a Vietnamese Refugee Centre. He questioned the criminal cases involved 
with the VRs. The then Secretary for Security Mrs Regina Ip provided figures in 
Table 3.1 & 3.2 in the next page.
With the available information gathered and the figures in Table 3.1 & 3.2, it showed 
a high crime rate regarding to the VBP. Together with numerous riots happened either 
in the close camps and open camps which caused casualties and deaths, the order and 
safety in Hong Kong were adversely affected at that time.
In dealing with the VBP issue, the repayment of the outstanding advances to the 
UNHCR stood at $1.16 billion. Mrs Ip stressed in 2000 that the HK Government had 
made repeated appeals to the UNHCR, but efforts had produced no result. With the 
failure in getting the repayment from UNHCR, the expenditure was shared by the 
Hong Kong taxpayers. The last payment, HK$3.9 million, was made in 1998. In 2012, 
The UNHCR revealed that they were unable to afford for paying the debt. They 
requested the debt to be forgiven in. In gist, the HK government spent an estimated 
HK$8.7 billion for the overall incident.
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Table 3.1  Numbers of Criminal Cases involving Vietnamese in Vietnamese Centres and Other Areas in Hong Kong in 1996 and 1997 
(January - September)
Open Centres Closed Centres Other Areas Total
Pillar Point New Horizons Kai Tak High Island Tai A Chau Whitehead Green Island
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
1996 1997
(Jan-Sep)
Assault on Police 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 -
Fighting in Public Place - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Murder/Manslaughter - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 3 -
Possession of Offensive Weapons - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 6 3 7 3
Rape - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 -
Robbery 2 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 11 5 13 6
Serious Assault 9 1 - - - - 5 2 1 - 7 - - - 11 16 33 19
Wounding 4 2 1 - - - 10 5 - - 7 1 - - 11 12 33 20
Others# 34 12 - - - - 3 2 - - 7 1 - - 340 268 384 283
Total 55 15 1 0 0 0 22 10 1 0 22 2 0 0 379 304 480 331
*1 Closed in March 1997.
*2 Closed in September 1996.
*3 Closed in Jne 1997.
# Included other non-violent crimes such as burglary and theft, fraud and forgery, dangerous drugs related offences, immigration offence, and so on.
Source:   Leg islat ive Counci l  Report  30-06-1999
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Table 3.2 Numbers of Criminal Cases involving Vietnamese in Vietnamese in 
Vietnamese Centres and Other Areas in Hong Kong since October 1977
1996 1997
(Jan-Sept)
1997
(Oct-Dec)
1997
(Total)
1998 1999
(Jan-May)
Assault on Police 6 - 1 1 6 3
Fighting in 
Public Place
- - - - 6 -
Murder/
Manslaughter
3 - - - - -
Possession of 
Offensive 
Weapons
7 3 1 4 1 -
Rape 1 - - - 1 1
Robbery 13 6 1 7 11 3
Serious Assault  33 19 3 22 23 -
Wounding 33 20 4 24 11 6
Others# 384 283 78 361 335 140
Total 480 331 88 419 394 153
* Include Pillar Point, High Island (closed in May 1998), New Horizons (closed in March 1998) and Green 
Island.  With the closure of more and more Vietnamese centres, the police does not keep separate crime 
statistics for individual centres since October 1997.
# Include other non-violent crimes such as burglary and theft, fraud and forgery, dangerous drugs related 
offences, immigration offences, and so on.
Source:  Legislative Council Report 30-06-1999
Concluding Comments
When the refugee issue started in 1975, the government had taken the sole responsibility to 
tackle the problem. As it was an unprecedented issue, the then Government literally had no 
policy or legislation to make reference to. The HK government took a leading and 
dominant role in the issue which had all the power to implement different policies and to 
employ various tools. Throughout the whole period, the issue was dealt with under a 
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regulated self-governance mode. The UNHCR and various voluntary agencies played a 
supporting role to implement the government policy. They had been cooperative to policies 
of the government. Although UNHCR and voluntary agencies were consulted, their 
recommendations may not be employed. Their political influence to the government was 
quite little.
Enormous public concern ascended whenever problem arose. Although the general public 
recognized the need to help VRs on humanitarian grounds, much of them concerned the 
emerging influx of refugees, security issue to the community, overpopulation, etc which 
ultimately accelerate the implementation of new policies. The problem stream influenced
the political atmosphere and contributed the most in this situation to open the policy 
window for the government to handle the issue.
Acting mostly as the supporting role to the government, UNHCR gave little political 
resistance to the government. The government had the power to react to the problems as 
well as social pressures and act on its own will e.g. the closed camp policy. Against 
opposition from the UNHCR, voluntary agencies and NGOs, the government took firm 
action in a view to solve the problem and soothe public resentment after assessed all 
alternatives. It was observed that from the planning, establishment and monitoring of the 
closed camps, all four policy tools of Capacity Building, Mandates, Inducement and 
System Changing were employed. 
Another characteristic of the issue was the stance and attitude of the then sovereignty of 
Hong Kong, the Britain. Since VR issue was a foreign affair, Hong Kong had to rely on 
Britain for diplomatic efforts and many policies had to be endorsed by the British 
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government, and sometimes from other related countries, before being put in place, such as 
the screening and repatriation policy. The then colonial government had to face 
international politics which was a very unique political stream issue. The political 
situations had indeed limited the policy choice of the then government. Similar situation 
will be observed when the current HKSAR government seeks to tackle the issue of asylum 
seeker in some ways involving foreign affairs.
Coupling with political issues, the HK government was prompted to implement new 
policies or improve existing policies when problems were found and when situations 
changed, for example overpopulation, gangs fight in camps and enormous influx of VR. 
Problem stream issues and political stream issues were the major factors opened policy 
windows and affected selection of available policy choices.
The HK government had implemented different policies comprehensively by employing all 
four types of policy tools at the same time, such as Inducement to bring in NGOs and 
voluntary agencies, Mandates to control the behaviour of the VRs, System Changing to 
draft new legislation and authorise different departments for certain purpose and Capacity 
Building to raise the education standard in camp. 
Analysing with responsive regulatory framework, it is observed that the colonial 
government did not only rush to law enforcement and sanction solutions to resolve the VR 
problem.  The government indeed firstly engaged UNHCR and NGOs and explored 
available policy tools to support capacity building of the society to handle VR issues, from 
allowing legal employment, to open camps policy supplemented with adequate facilities
and education.  Until the support policies failed to resolve the issues owing to the reasons 
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such as withdrawals of other countries to accept VRs, deteriorating public security, 
exhausting public resource and rising public sentiment, the government resorted to 
sanction pyramid and escalated intervention and punitive actions from closed camp, 
screening policy to the ultimate means of repatriation.  In fact, the government had used 
actions in pyramids of supports and sanctions interchangeably to resolve the issue as a 
continuous process which had avoided stigmatization of VRs.  
In administering asylum seekers in Hong Kong, the incumbent HKSAR government could 
make reference to the above empirical analysis and thoroughly studied the lessons learnt in 
and policy plan used by colonial government to handling VRs.   The coming two 
chapters will outline the current situation of administering NRCs and emerging social 
problems in Hong Kong.  An empirical analysis using the same analytical framework will 
be conducted to evaluate the current government policies in administering asylum seekers.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ADMINISTERING ASYLUM SEEKERS –
NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS
Introduction
Comparing to the issue of VRs, the history of on-going NRCs issue is still short. In 1992, 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment ("CAT Convention") has been extended to Hong Kong and until 2003 the 
issues arising from the NRC claim and torture claim emerge in Hong Kong.  On the other 
hand, as the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the 1951 
UN Convention”) does not apply to Hong Kong, it is the policy of Hong Kong government 
not to grant asylum to refugee.  This Chapter will outline development of all relevant 
conventions and court rulings on handling NRCs in Hong Kong, and the response given by 
the Government towards those conventions and rulings. 
CAT Convention
Article 3 of CAT convention was specifically related to non-refoulement claim, which 
stated that ”No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture” and “For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights” (General Assembly of United Nation, 1984).
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Situation in Hong Kong Before Relevant Court Judgement in 2004
Prior to 2003, the CAT convention was followed and exercised to the extent that the local 
government would prevent police or public officers to deliberately impose any pain, 
physically or mentally, to any person while performing official duties. Measures were 
introduced to detect physical torture and investigations would be performed upon the 
lodgment of complaint by the designated unit within or outside the alleged departments.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Basic Law secured the provisions of the ICCPR in Hong 
Kong and was formulated in the Bill of Right Ordinance. Laws in Hong Kong also 
provided the protection to different kinds of persons against torture. 
Initially, notwithstanding the obligation of the local government not to repatriate persons to 
another state where the person may be subjected to torture under the CAT convention, the 
local government had no independent assessment as to torture claim or asylum cases. It 
relied solely on the UNHCR which assessed both torture claim and asylum cases. The local 
government made decisions on torture claim cases based merely on assessments and 
determination of UNHCR. Even more, the local government had not provided asylum 
seekers, torture claimants and refugees any welfare assistance while they were in Hong 
Kong. It was the UNHCR who supported the vulnerable with welfare assistance (Hong 
Kong (China) Security Bureau (SB), Health, Welfare and Food Bureau (HWFB) &
Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB), 2006).
In 2002, an appellant lodged a judicial review against the decision of the Secretary for 
Security to deport him to a state where he may face physical torture. Consistent with the 
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general procedures and basis of decision, the Secretary for Security and the ImmD merely 
relied on an unexplained rejection of refugee status of UNHCR to determine the torture 
claim case of the appellant as well as to make the decision to deport him (Hong Kong 
Judiciary (Judiciary), 2004).  In the ruling, the court judged that the administration should 
undertake independent assessment with the high standards of fairness in determining the 
potential deportee’s torture claim and whether to remove such person. The potential 
deportee should be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim and such 
claim should be properly assessed, with all relevant matters considered, by the Secretary. 
The potential deportee should be given the corresponding reasons to reject his claim by the 
Secretary. The decision of the Secretary should also be subjected to administrative 
review and judicial review base on rule of law (Judiciary, 2004).
Government Policy After 2003 Court Judgement
The Administrative Screening Mechanism: 2004
The government, after the aforesaid court judgement, swiftly established an independent 
administrative screening mechanism to handle the torture claim cases under Article 3 of the 
CAT convention. All torture claim cases would be assessed by the ImmD which officers 
would interview the claimants and determine whether the case was substantiated. Those
screened-in would not be removed to a country he may be in danger facing torture. 
However, the claimants may be removed to another country where he would not be 
tortured or to the country if there was a change in condition so that the claimant’s case 
would not substantiate anymore. If the claimant failed to establish his claim, he would be 
removed in accordance to the law of Hong Kong (SB, HWFB & EMB, 2006).
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Normally, torture claimants would not be detained unless he had breached his condition of 
stay or other laws in Hong Kong. They may be released on recognisances on the discretion 
of the director of the ImmD on a case by case basis.
Other Court Rulings
Since then, torture claimants consistently made use of the administration review and 
judicial review to challenge the decision of the local government in respect to the 
procedural fairness and treatments to the claimants. Many of the judgements in the period 
of 2004 to 2014 had caused changes to the procedures of the screening mechanisms and 
the treatment to the claimants.
Three of these court judgements had caused significant changes in the screening 
mechanism. The court judgement in 2008 ruled that the administration should implement a 
series of measures to meet the high standard of fairness which forced the then 
administration to introduce the enhanced administrative mechanism to screen the torture 
claim cases in 2009 (Judiciary, 2009).
The Court of Final Appeal ruled in the case of Ubamaka Edward Wilson vs the Secretary 
for Security in 2012 requiring the administration not to remove foreigners to a country 
where his claim of facing danger under Article 3 of Bill of Right Ordinance (BOR3) was 
substantiated, and BOR3 was absolute and non-derogable. The content of BOR3 is 
extracted below.
Article 3 of Bill of Right (BOR3)
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The Bill of Right Ordinance in Hong Kong incorporated the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which applied to the territory. Article 3 of this 
ordinance was formulated in relation to the Article 7 of ICCPR. BOR3 stated that: “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation” (HK government, 1991).
In 2013, The Court of Final Appeal ruled again in the case of C & Ors vs Director of 
Immigration in relation to non-refoulement claim in Hong Kong. The court considered in 
its ruling that the local government normally halted the removal of a person, for 
humanitarian grounds, who made an asylum claim to the UNHCR and it would not 
repatriate the person if his claim was substantiated. Coupling the above practice with the 
memorandum of understanding signed between UNHCR and the local government, the 
government should consider the removal of the claimants case by case independently on its 
own merit while UNHCR had the full responsibility to the determination (Judiciary, 2013).
The above two court ruling had forced the administration to implement the latest screening 
mechanism, the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM), in 2014. The mechanism does not 
only assess all torture claim cases in Hong Kong, but also claims under BOR3 and asylum 
claims. All these claims were known as Non-Refoulement Claim. It should be reiterated 
that the change in policy or rulings did not change the stance of the local government of 
not granting asylum to any person in Hong Kong.
Regarding the social welfare policy towards torture claimants, the local government had 
not provided any welfare assistance to the vulnerable torture claimants, asylum seekers or 
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refugees prior to 2006 and those assistances had been provided by UNHCR. Similarly, 
court rulings had great influence on government policy in this area. After a series of 
judicial review, the local government was obliged to provide with the claimants and 
refugees in kind assistance (Mark Daly, 2009 & Ramsden and Marsh, 2014). The 
assistances, which are less than social security assistances given to the local resident,
intended only to meet the basic needs of the vulnerable so as to prevent a magnetic effect 
to attract influx of torture claimants and asylum seekers to Hong Kong (Security Bureau, 
2015).  Details of the assistance will be discussed in the next chapter.
Analysis on Refugee Policy Development
Roles and influences of NGO in refugee policy development
The role of NGOs and their influence to the policy formulation or amendment could 
influence the mode of governance and policy dynamics and thus affect the choice of policy 
tools available of the local government. In addition to the collaborative role of the NGO 
in providing in kind assistances, NGOs and advocates, who have put tremendous effort in 
advocating a humane and generous refugee policy, in terms of welfare assistance and 
screening policy, had in fact play a key role in change of refugee policy in Hong Kong It 
is also undeniable that the obligation of Hong Kong in the international covenant on Civil 
and Political right (ICCPR) and CAT convention have given NGOs, UNHCR and 
advocates certain political powers in administering asylum seeks in Hong Kong.
The international covenant on Civil and Political right (ICCPR)
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ICCPR is an international human right treaty which stipulates general principles of basic 
human rights and fundamental freedom. All state parties have to periodically report to
The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body to monitor the implementation of the 
ICCPR, the latest development and implementation of human right in the state. 
Recommendations and views of NGOs were also considered by HRC as shadow report. 
HRC would compare the facts and analysis against the report submitted by the government
while compiling its conclusion (American Civil Liberties Union, 2014).
The British Government extended ICCPR to Hong Kong in 1976. As stipulated and agreed 
in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, ICCPR would continue to be effective after the 
handover of Hong Kong to China. Hong Kong would submit report separately the 
implementation of ICCPR in the HKSAR, to the HRC. The second report of HKSAR was 
submitted in 2005 and the hearing was held in 2006. 
The monitoring system employed by HCR had allowed NGOs to express their concern and 
present their recommendations internationally to pressure the local government to response 
and react. The NGOs and advocates had a monitoring role to the compliance of the local 
government to the human right treaties. However, the administration of Hong Kong 
seemed to be reluctant to commit to new policies and may not response to the 
recommendations given by the HRC. For instance, the concluding observation of HRC in 
2006 recommended the administration the following: “The HKSAR should establish an 
appropriate mechanism to assess the risk faced by individuals expressing fears of being victims of 
grave human rights violations in the locations to which they may be returned.”  (Human Right 
Committee, 2006, P3).
The administration had until the respective court rulings in 2012 and 2013 to put in place 
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the mechanism recommended. The local government also stayed firm not to grant asylum 
to anybody in Hong Kong and resist the idea of extending the 1951 refugee convention and 
1967 refugee protocol to Hong Kong. Notwithstanding this, the local government was open 
to listen to the opinions of the public and NGOs, and was willing to take into consideration 
opinions received. 
Separation of Powers
Hong Kong, as a common law jurisdiction, has an effective check and balance system 
between the three branches of executive, legislative and judiciary in Hong Kong. The 
rule of law and judicial independence in Hong Kong had ensured the work of the 
Government duly monitored. In a recent speech of the Chief Justice Mr. Geoffrey Ma
Tao-li, Ma assured that "Those components of the rule of law which are of particular 
relevance to Hong Kong - indeed to all common law jurisdictions, of which Hong Kong is 
one - comprise first, the due recognition of rights and fundamental freedoms," and 
“Decisions of the courts may sometimes not be to everybody's liking - whether they be 
private individuals, political and other groups, or even the government - but it is not the 
role of the courts to make popular decisions", "The function of the courts is to adjudicate 
on disputes according to the law and its spirit" (Stuart Lau, 2016).
Role and Function of Judiciary in Refugee Policy Development
In Hong Kong, the court judge cases based solely on the legal basis. Nonetheless, in 
colonial era, it could be seen that the law was a part of the refugee policy which was a tools 
made use by lawmakers and the British government. The court rulings and the subsequent 
-70-
changes of policies are corrections of the administration towards the implementation of a 
general policy stipulated in different ordinance, rather than formulation of new policies. 
The role of the court should be regarded merely as a monitor within the system.
It is commonly observed that NGOs working together with and supporting NRCs to apply 
for judicial review to challenge decision of USM. Claimants and NGOs usually quote 
human right related provisions in domestic laws to challenge the decision of the 
administration and to fight for more favourable treatments to them or their moral believes.  
Although the ruling may not be in favour to claimants all the times, NRCs, NGOs and the 
judiciary in fact lines up a monitoring mechanism which may cause changes to the 
implementation of refugee policy. 
Mode of Governance in Refugee Policy Development
As part of the check and balance system, the administration and the legislation had all the 
means and power to adjust the policy or to formulate a new policy whenever they found the 
general policy outdated or ineffective. In other words, the local government still possesses 
administrative powers and legal obligations in administering asylum seekers.  The mode 
of governance is thus regulated self-governance.
Policy Dynamics in Refugee Policy Development
Under the regulated self-governance and limited influence of the NGOs, the government 
could accord priority to the interests of local residents and the government as a whole in 
policy making process. Prior to implementation of USM, the general public was not fully 
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aware of the issue and thus no demand for policy change was urged. Before the court 
ruling required the administration to rectify its action, there is no political pressure or other 
initiative to place the issue upon the policy agenda.  As such, the change in government 
policies and actions at this stage is solely based upon problem streams.
Policy Tools in Refugee Policy Development
Different court rulings had resulted in a variety of change in actions and policies of the 
local government. The implementation of the administrative screening mechanism by 
authorising the ImmD to screen all torture claim cases is an responsive policy tools of 
system changing. ImmD officers were trained before taking up the screening 
responsibility and the training is a kind of capacity building activity. The collaboration 
between local government and NGOs in the provision of in kind assistances had employed 
the policy tools of inducement. Last but not least, the newly legislated statutory screening 
process in USM it is also a type of mandate. All in all, all four types of policy tools, i.e. 
Mandate, Capacity Building, Inducement and System Changing were adopted in the 
general policy to administering NRCs in Hong Kong. Those policy tools could be 
regarded as actions in the support pyramid and no sanction actions have been used in 
absence of any exceptional circumstances which require immediate intervention and 
stringent enforcement.
Concluding Comments
The mode of governance throughout the above period is regulated self-governance. The 
Government had all along taken into considerations the opinions and recommendations of 
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HRC and NGOs and upheld its legal obligation to react to emerging problems by taking 
responsive actions or implementing new policies. At the meantime, the Government had to
be aware of the international politics and practices about administering asylum seekers that 
may affect the local situation significantly even alter the mode of governance.
The general policy of not granting asylum was unchanged. One of the reasons why the 
government has not introduced new policies before establishment of USM was the lack of 
public concern about the issue or any critical problematic issues. The sole dominating 
factor that resulted in changes of policy, i.e. establishment of USM is the court ruling 
instead of other politics and policy issues.  
The next chapter illustrates the current situations of Hong Kong in administering asylum 
seekers, details of existing government policy and the USM as well as evolving and 
imminent social problems.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ADMINISTERING ASYLUM SEEKERS –
THE CURRENT SITUATION
Introduction
As stipulated in the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), foreigners smuggling themselves 
into Hong Kong, and visitors overstaying beyond their limit of stay or being refused entry 
to Hong Kong by the ImmD are liable to be removed from Hong Kong as soon as 
practicable.  However, if foreigners claim to be facing a risk of being subjected to torture, 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or persecution in the country of 
origin, the ImmD should not remove them unless going through an established screening 
mechanism to determine their claims. There has been a rise in torture or non-refoulement 
claims under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) since it was introduced to Hong Kong in 1992.  In 
accordance with Article 3 of the CAT, it is stipulated that "no State Party shall expel, return 
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture".
Followed by a series of court rulings since June 2004 in Hong Kong, the screening 
procedures for the torture / non-refoulement claims are of much higher standards of 
fairness nowadays.  In particular, the Court of First Instance’s judgment in the FB & 
Others in December 2008 ruled that the screening procedures put in place by the 
Administration were not able to meet the high standards of fairness and required that the 
screening mechanism for torture claims should be improved, among others, on the 
following aspects:-
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(a) publicly-funded legal assistance to needy claimants should be provided;
(b) the decision-maker on a claim should be the officer who has interviewed the claimant; 
and;
(c) oral hearing of a petition should be arranged where required.
In order to ensure the screening process for non-refoulement claims could meet the high 
standards required by law, the Government enhanced its administrative mechanism in this 
regard in December 2009.  In March 2014, the Government implemented the Unified 
Screening Mechanism (USM) to determine for claims for non-refoulement protection 
against expulsion or extradition of the claimants to another country from Hong Kong on all 
applicable grounds. The protection covers the circumstances as laid in risks of torture 
under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in 
section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383), and persecution with 
reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which is also in compliance with the rulings of the Court 
of Final Appeal (CFA) in December 2012 and March 2013.  Upon the commencement of 
the USM in 2014, a total of 6 700 non-refoulement claims were pending assessment.
Up to the end of March 2016, the number of claimants pending assessment has 
accumulated to 11 201 claimants.  The top five countries of origin of the claimants are 
south or Southeast Asian countries, i.e. Vietnam (22%), India (19%), Pakistan (18%), 
Bangladesh (12%) and Indonesia (10%).  51% of claimants were smuggling into Hong 
Kong, and 47% of which were overstayers or visitors being refused to land.
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Table 5.1 – Number of Torture / Non-refoulement Claim Cases in Hong Kong
Year Received Determined
Withdrawn or 
Taken No 
Further Action
Outstanding
(Cumulative)
Before 2005 53 0 4 49
2005 211 1 30 229
2006 528 43 54 660
2007 1 584 82 51 2 111
2008 2 198 179 132 3 998
2009 3 286 0 1 037 6 340
2010 1 809 214 1 186 6 749
2011 1 432 932 802 6 447
2012 1 174 1 575 1 154 4 892
2013 491 1 813 778 2 792
2014 8 851 1 047 978 9 618
2015 5 053 2 339 1 410 10 922
2016 (Jan-Mar) 1 157 545 333 11 201
Total on Torture / 
Non-refoulement 
Claims
27 827 8 770 7 949 11 201
Nationality Number of Claimants
Vietnamese 2 484
Indian 2 073
Pakistani 1 996
Bangladeshi 1 353
Indonesian 1 134
Filipino 427
Nepalese 304
Sri Lankan 304
Gambian 159
Others 967
Total 11 201
Source: Website of Immigration Department HKSAR (http://www.immd.gov.hk/)
According to ImmD’s records, 74% of claimants are male, 76% of them aged ranging from 
18 to 40 years old, and 94% came to Hong Kong alone without their family.  Around 70% 
of them lodged a claim whenever they were intercepted or arrested by enforcement agents. 
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An average duration of stay in Hong Kong of the claimants before a claim is lodged is 
around 19 months.  The reason why they came to and hid in Hong Kong and how they 
survived in Hong Kong without permission to work during such a long period of stay are in 
doubt. 
Between late 2009 and March 2016, a total of 8 465 torture/non-refoulement claims have 
been determined where only 52 of them were substantiated (27% from Sri Lankan; 17% 
from Cameroonian; 15% from Jordanian; 7.7% from Congo, Iranian and Rwandan each) 
but none of them were Vietnamese, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indonesian (i.e. the 
top five countries of origin for the claims).  In this light, there exists a doubt on whether 
the claimants have abused the non-refoulement system. 
In the following sections, an empirical analysis will be conducted on the exiting policy to 
administer the asylum seekers as well as the problems thus generated by this issue based 
on the analytical framework devised in Chapter Two. 
Existing Policy for Non-refoulement Claimants
Elmore and McDonnel (1987) had categorised policy tools into 4 types, i.e. mandates, 
inducement, capacity building and system changing.  The four different dimensions of 
policy tools have indeed been currently adopted by the Government in administering the 
NRCs, which is going to be elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
Unified Screening Mechanism (USM)
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Pursuant to a number of court rulings requiring high standard of fairness, the Hong Kong 
Government has refined the USM to determine for claims for non-refoulement protection 
in March 2004.  Under USM, only the following two types of persons who are outside 
their country of their nationality and in Hong Kong are entitled to claim non-refoulement 
protection:-
(a) the person is subject or liable to removal from Hong Kong and, apart from a Risk State, 
the persons does not have a right of abode or right to land in, or right to return to, any 
other State in which the person would be entitled to non-refoulement protecton; or
(b) the person is a person whose surrender is requested in surrender proceedings.  
A written intention for seeking non-refoulement protection is required to be signified by 
the claimants to ImmD.  Fingerprints and photographs will be taken with the claimants.  
Once the ImmD officer is satisfied with the grounds for making non-refoulement claim, a 
briefing session will be arranged by the Removal Assessment Section of the ImmD to the 
claimants in respect of the non-refoulement screening procedures, and their right and 
welfare offered by the Government. 
Upon commencement of the screening procedures, the claimants have to submit an official 
non-refoulement claim form listing out the basis of their claim, together with necessary 
supporting documents if any. In addition to the statutory period of 28 days as stipulated 
under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, the Government would provide 
extra 21 days for completing the form through administrative means as per the agreement 
with DLS in 2014 so as to smoothen the USM.  The claimants are allowed to apply for 
extension if so warranted. 
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Once the claim form is received, screening interviews will be arranged by the ImmD to the 
claimants, which generally will be completed in 13 weeks.  Based on the supporting 
documents submitted by the claimants and assessment during screening interviews, the 
ImmD may determine the claim in around five weeks.  In theory, the non-refoulement 
claim could be determined within six months upon its commencement. 
An appeal mechanism is available for the claimants to lodge appeal to Torture Claims 
Appeal Board (TCAB) against the ImmD’s decision within 14 days.  The TCAB normally 
needs another three months to determine the appeal. However, the duration for screening a 
claims mostly depends on whether the claimants are cooperative in the process.  In reality, 
many claimants have failed to contact their duty lawyer, attend screening interviews or 
submit necessary supporting documents as requested by ImmD, which will delay the 
screening process.  The non-compliance of the claimants may jeopardize their credibility 
on the non-refoulement claims.  However, under the current jurisprudence, the ImmD still 
requires to maintain high standard of fairness as stipulated by law to follow every step of 
the screening procedures strictly. Otherwise, the claimants may have grounds to lodge a 
judicial review because of the possible procedural unfairness, which will further delay the 
screening process and removal of the false torture / NRCs. 
Amongst the 11201 claimants pending determination for their non-refoulement claims at 
the end of March 2016, the average duration they have remained in Hong Kong is around 
2.7 years. The procedures of the USM are illustrated in the following figure:-
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Figure 5.1– Processing Non-refoulement Claims under the USM
Source: Website of Immigration Department HKSAR (http://www.immd.gov.hk/)
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Legal Aid Assistance
Meanwhile, once the screening procedures commence, the NRCs will be referred to the 
DLS by the ImmD.  A duty lawyer will be assigned to the claimants, following its 
established assignment system for handling the referrals.  The lawyers under the 
assignment system of the DLS are mostly appointed by The Hong Kong Bar Association 
(HKBA) and The Law Society of Hong Kong (LSHK). 
The scope of legal assistance to the claimants under the Scheme is as follows:
(a) To advise the claimant of his legal right and the procedures in the process of his 
non-refoulement claim(s) on applicable grounds.
(b) To assist the claimant to complete and submit the non-refoulement claim form.
(c) To accompany the claimant to attend screening interview(s), if considered 
necessary by the duty lawyer.
(d) To assess merits of appeal and/or petition for claims rejected by the Immigration 
Department.
(e) To prepare submissions for the appellant and/or petitioner for meritorious appeal 
and/or petition cases; and
(f) To represent the claimant at oral hearing, if any.
(g) To assist the claimant in making a request to re-open a non-refoulement claim or to 
make a subsequent claim in meritorious cases
(h) To prepare submissions for the claimant in an objection notice on revocation in 
meritorious cases
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The legal assistance is entirely free of charge only if the claimants make a statutory 
declaration that they could not afford to pay the legal cost and are eligible for the 
assistance. 
The Humanitarian Assistance Programme
On humanitarian grounds, the Government has to make sure the NRCs pending 
determination could meet their basic needs for living and thus has been rendering 
assistance to prevent those claimants from becoming destitute.  Under the assistance 
programme offered by the Government since April 2006, the claimants are provided with 
temporary accommodation, basic utilities allowance, food, clothing, basic necessities, 
appropriate transport allowance and counselling activities.
The responsible government authority for the assistance programme is the Social Welfare 
Department (SWD).  However, through tendering exercise in compliance with the Stores 
and Procurement Regulations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be awarded 
with the service contracts to operate the assistance programme under Government funding, 
instead of being run by SWD itself.  SWD will closely monitor implementation of the 
assistance programme by NGOs through regular and surprise inspections and established 
mechanism on handling complaints from service users.
In addition, the Hospital Authority (HA) or SWD will grant one-off waivers of medical 
expenses at public clinics or hospitals to those claimants in need on a case-by-case basis. 
The Education Bureau (EDB) will arrange appropriate school placement to minor 
claimants who are willing to received education and will not be dispersed from Hong Kong 
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in the foreseeable future. The Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency 
will consider any extra subsidy to the needy. 
In view of the rise of price level, the Government has increased the allowances on 
accommodation, food, transportation and utilities allowances to the claimants since 
February 2014. 
l The rent allowance grid per adult claimant has been increased to $1,500 per month; 
rental deposits of up to $3,000 or an amount equivalent to two months of rent, 
whichever is less; and property agent fees of up to $750 or an amount equivalent to 
the rent for half a month, whichever is less;
l The budget for food for each claimant has been increased to $1,200 per month; 
l The allowance for utilities per claimant has been increased to $300 per month; and 
l The transportation allowance per claimant has been increased, ranging from $200 to 
$420 per month depending on their location of residence and the number of routine 
journeys.
In lieu of the provision of in-kind food assistance, food coupons to the claimants, which 
are non-cashable and non-transferable, in the amount of $1,200 per month have been 
introduced.  For exceptional cases, in-kind food assistance will continue to be provided to 
the claimants.
The above policies for administering and supporting the NRCs are developed, following a 
series of court rulings which have been made to urge the Government to formulate an 
effective system to screen the claims of a high standard of fairness in accordance with the 
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relevant conventions and local legislations. 
As such, the Government has modified and implemented a set of policy tools to administer 
the non-refoulement claims.  It is basically mandatory for the Government to review and 
refine the local legislations and policies from time to time in order to fulfill the 
conventions and court rulings.  The USM and humanitarian assistance programme to the 
claimants are thus introduced by the Government to govern the screening process.  All 
these initiatives are regarded as “Mandates” as defined by Elmore and McDonnel (1987). 
To attract the most competent NGOs to provide support to the claimants during screening 
procedures, the Government would call for an open tender and invite NGOs to bid for 
offering humanitarian assistance to the claimants.   Through a stringent selection process, 
contract under public funding would be awarded to the most competent NGOs.  The 
favourable funding and formal recognition would be given to the chosen NGOs by the 
Government, which should be catorgized as “Inducement” according to Elmore and 
McDonnel. 
The possible abuse of the screening mechanism has generated plenty of social problems to 
the Hong Kong society.  To relieve the sentiment of the society, the Government needs to 
streamline the screening procedures to avoid unnecessary delay, i.e. “System Changing” 
and build up greater capacity of ImmD to handle the steer number of non-refoulement 
claims. i.e. “Capacity Building”.  As such, the manpower and resources of the ImmD are
to be increased to expedite the screening process against the non-refoulement claims while 
trainings to the ImmD officers are also required in order to maintain high efficiency.
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All along, a large policy forces are being exerted by different players in the society or even 
the world.  The policy window to change the policy has opened. In recent years, the 
policy window becomes far wider due to unprecedented challenges generated from the 
refugee problems over the world.  In facing the challenges under such as mandatory 
circumstances, the Government is the one having the highest legal obligation to take the 
lead to address and solve the problems with a view to fulfilling the expectation of the 
public and the claimants pending determination.  However, it is definitely not efficient 
and effective enough to solely rely on the Government’s resources and expertise to manage
these social matters, such as the humanitarian support towards the claimants. 
Therefore, the government needs to facilitate closer cooperation and interaction between 
public and private actors, such as LegCo members, NGOs and other concerned groups.  
When formalizing a comprehensive policy to tackle these topical issues, the Government 
takes initiative to encourage the participation from the public and other stakeholders so as 
to enhance the transparency and acceptability of the policy.   According to Knill and 
Tosun (2012), the type of governance currently being adopted by the Government in 
administering the non-refoulement claims is “Regulated Self-governance”, which is a 
mixture of hierarchy and market modes.  Through addressing the social problems led by 
the issue of asylum seekers, the policy dynamics thus created and respective policy tools 
applied by the government will be further explored.
Social Problems Stemmed from Non-refoulement Claimants
Commission of Crimes
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According to the figure from ImmD, the total number of non-ethnic Chinese illegal 
immigrants (NECIIs) in 2015 is 3819, in which 2278 of the IIs came from Vietnam.  As 
per the analysis by ImmD, besides upturn of Hong Kong’s economy and attractive job 
opportunity in Hong Kong, the main cause of the increase of IIs is believed to be seeking 
refugee protection from Hong Kong Government.  The following table shows the 
breakdown of nationality of NECIIs in 2015:-
Table 5.2 – Nationality Breakdown of NECIIs in Year 2005 
Nationality Number of NECIIs
Vietnam 2 278
Pakistan 686
Bangladesh 414
India 380
Nepal 31
Others 30
Total 3 819
Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 13 April 2016 - IIs and Torture/NRCs
According to the record of Police since 2013, the number of arrested NRCs was drastically 
increasing between 2014 and 2015.  The criminal offences committed by those NECIIs 
are tabulated in Table 5.3 on the next page.
In 2005, the total number of arrested persons by Police was 33778 while 3% of which were 
NRCs.  The most common criminal offences committed by those claimants were 
shoptheft, serious drugs offences, miscellaneous theft and assault, which caused 
disturbance to the Hong Kong citizens.  The majority of the culprits were from India, 
Vietnam and Pakistan, which were not the countries involved in the 52 substantiated cases. 
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Table 5.3 – Number of NECIIs arrested for Criminal Offences between Year 2013 & 
2015 
Offences 2013 2014 2015
Shop Theft 78 147 277
Serious Drugs Offences 79 79 159
Miscellaneous Theft 80 86 110
Wounding and Serious Assault 100 67 100
Serious Immigration Offences 30 34 85
Forgery and Coinage 31 40 80
Disorder / Fighting in Public Place 35 43 64
Other Offences 175 169 238
Total 608 665 1 113
Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 24 February 2016 – Public Expenditure Relating to 
Handling of Torture and Non-refoulement Claims
In November 2009, the Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance 2009 came into effect where 
a new section 38AA to the Ordinance was added to prohibit IIs and persons who are 
subject to removal or deportation orders from taking any employment, or establishing or 
joining in any business. The number of NRCs arrested for breach of section 38AA is
tabulated below:
Table 5.4 – NECIIs on Recognizance arrested for Breach of Section 38AA
Year Number of Persons Arrested
2009 (since November) 36
2010 172
2011 156
2012 190
2013 165
2014 166
2015 232
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Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 24 February 2016 – Public Expenditure Relating to 
Handling of Torture and Non-refoulement Claims
Up to now, over 1000 of them have been prosecuted and sentenced by the Court but the 
deterrence effect is still in question. Apart from the above criminal offences, the number of 
NRCs participating triad activities is on a rise according to the Police’s record from 3 in 
2014 to 24 in 2015. The significant upsurge of the crime figures involving the NRCs has
drawn the public concern about their well-being and safety.  To certain extent, the Police 
also concerned about whether any terrorists have sneaked into and remained in Hong Kong 
seeking refugee protection. 
Excessive public expenditure
NRCs are IIs or overstayers, may not take up employment in Hong Kong as stipulated in 
the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115.  On humanitarian grounds, the Government, in 
collaboration with non-governmental organization, is using the public fund to offer 
financial support to the NRCs in accordance with court rulings, including accommodation 
allowance, food coupons, and other allowances for basic necessities, public utilities, 
transport and counselling services so as to prevent the claimants from falling into 
destitution during the screening procedures. The relevant expenditure and service users of 
the in-kind assistance services during the past three years are tabulated below:
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Table 5.5 - Expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance from Year 2012 to 2015
Financial Year Humanitarian Assistance 
($million)
Service Users
(Monthly Average)
2012-2013 191 5 687
2013-2014 204 5 153
2014-2015 246 7 357
Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 29 April 2015 – Possible Abuse of Mechanism for 
Making Claims for Non-refoulement Protection Against Expulsion, Return or Extradition from Hong Kong
On the top of the above humanitarian assistance, HA and SWD will grant one-off waivers 
of medical expenses at public clinics or hospitals to claimants on a case-by-case basis. 
Moreover, EDB will also arrange school placements to some eligible minor claimants 
whenever necessary. 
According to the HA's record, the situations of medical fee waiver granted to claimants 
between 2008 and 2015 are tabulated below at Table 5.6 on the next page.
Since the commencement of the modified screening mechanism in December 2009, legal 
assistance to NRCs has been made available through DLS. 480 duty lawyers (either 
barristers or solicitors) are at present on the DLS roster, who have received specialized 
training to provide assistance to claimants.
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Table 5.6 - Public Hospital Services with Fee Waiver Granted to Claimants between 
Year 2008 and 2015
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of 
in-patient cases 
with fee waiver
182 265 606 815 610 367 954 1 421
Number of 
in-patient cases 
with fee waiver
2 911 6 109 8 477 8 728 8 096 6 386 10 792 15 685
Total Number of 
Cases
3 093 6 374 9 083 9 543 8 706 6 753 11 746 17 106
Amount waived 
for in-patient 
services 
($million)
3.9 4.1 8.1 19.5 14.7 13.8 18.6 29.5
Amount waived 
for in-patient 
services 
($million)
1.5 2.8 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.6 8.8 13.5
Total Amount 
($million)
5.4 6.9 12.2 23.8 18.7 18.4 27.4 43.0
Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 24 February 2016 – Public Expenditure Relating to 
Handling of Torture and Non-refoulement Claims
In sum, the estimated expenditure relating to the handling of non-refoulement claims 
amounts to $644 million in 2015-2016, including $207 million for screening claims and 
processing appeals (i.e. manpower and resources from ImmD, the Torture Claims Appeal 
Board, and the Department of Justice to screen the claims), $108 million for the provision 
of legal assistance, and $329 million for humanitarian assistance. The public expenditure 
for non-refoulement claims has been drastically increasing in the past few years from $287 
million in 2010-2011 to a projection of $644 million for 2015-2016.  There has already 
been a dramatic jump of rate over 124%, not to mention other relevant costs, such as legal 
aid granted to the claimants for lodging judicial reviews, public healthcare services, and 
judicial proceedings against claimants involved in the commission of crimes. 
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According to the ImmD’s record, the total number of cases where leave is granted by the 
Court to claimants for lodging judicial reviews against the decisions in relation to their 
claims between 2009 and 2015 are tabulated below:
Table 5.7 – Judicial Reviews granted to Claimants against the Decisions in relation to 
their Claims between Year 2009 and 2015
Year Number of Judicial Review Cases
2009 0
2010 1
2011 1
2012 15
2013 9
2014 42
2015 24
Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 24 February 2016 – Public Expenditure Relating to 
Handling of Torture and Non-refoulement Claims
The following table has summarized the respective legal costs for handling the judicial 
reviews filed by the claimants according to the Legal Aid Department's (LAD) record:-
Table 5.8 – Legal Costs incurred for handling the Judicial Reviews granted to 
Claimants between Year 2009 and 2016
Financial Year
Total legal cost incurred (including costs 
paid to the DoJ (as book entry)) ($million)
2009-2010 0.27
2010-2011 2.61
2011-2012 0.23
2012-2013 6.58
2013-2014 7.68
2014-2015 7.00
2015-2016
(up to January 2016)
11.28
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Source: Official Record of Proceedings of LegCo on 24 February 2016 – Public Expenditure Relating to 
Handling of Torture and Non-refoulement Claims
Abuse of Screening Mechanism
In between late 2009 and March 2016, a total of 8 465 torture/non-refoulement claims 
were determined but only 52 of them have been substantiated, consisting of 27% from Sri 
Lankan, 17% from Cameroonian, 15% from Jordanian, 7.7% from Congo, Iranian and 
Rwandan each.  However, none of substantiated claimants came from Vietnam, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh or Indonesia, which are the top five countries of origin for the 
claims.  
From the above figure, it appears that the majority of NRCs are actually false refugees.  
The possibility that the claimants are seeking allowances, illegal employment or quick 
money from crimes could not be ruled out.  In any case, if the abuse of the screening 
mechanism does exist, it would definitely cause heavy burden to the Hong Kong society. 
In the HKSAR v Tarok Das case, the Court of First Instance of the High Court also pointed 
out that the number of claims had seen a dramatic increase, seriously impacting the 
operation of the court and the legal system. The unmeritorious and unworthy claims should 
be weeded out promptly to avoid the abuse of the system by claimants with a more sinister 
purpose in mind to achieve illegal purposes (Secretary for Security, 2015).
In addition, the recent intelligence revealed that agencies or intermediaries are now 
available in India to provide on-stop service, called “asylum visa” to Indian nationals. 
The agencies would provide transportation for their nationals to Hong Kong, arrangement 
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of non-refoulement claim as well as unlawful employment in Hong Kong during the 
screening procedures.  This topic has been brought up in LegCo meeting, and the 
Government has also held meetings with the Consul General of India in Hong Kong to 
deter this kind of illegal activities.  The Government would look into whether similar 
situation would exist in other countries.  The investigation is still underway. 
It is observed that the Government is taking the lead to address and solve the problems 
with various departments and stakeholders, which provides more and clear evidence that 
“Regulated Self-governance” is being adopted in tacking this matter under close 
cooperation between the market and the government. It is evident that the NRCs growingly 
created greater burden to the society in terms of crime rates and public expenditures.   
The problems have attracted the concern from the press and public about the well-being of 
the local citizens. However, the existing policies to manage the non-refoulement claims 
including the USM, duty legal service and humanitarian assistance programme are not 
effective and comprehensive enough to swiftly filter the abuser of the system.  As such, a 
huge amount of resources have been wasted in entertaining the bogus refugee, which does 
not tally with the objectives to protect the genuine refugee, defined by UNCHR and the 
local judges.  It is necessary to revise the policies to balance the expectation of all parties 
under the current legal framework in order to enhance its efficiency and cost effectiveness. 
Apart from the local Government, other stakeholders involved in this topical issue, such as 
LegCo members, Judiciary, media, NGOs and the public are highly concerned about the 
social problems resulted from the non-refoulement claims.  In addition, how the 
Government treated and managed the NRCs is also under the close monitoring by 
UNCHR.
-93-
According to Kingdon (2003), the three streams, i.e. problem, policy and political are 
representing the important dimensions for the government policy making process, and this 
model describes the interrelationships among them on how their connection leads to the 
generation of a policy window.   Based on the above observations on the problem, policy 
and political aspects, there is a great political force and dynamic urging for a change of 
policy for this refugee issue.  Under such circumstances, the policy window has been 
widely opened in policy making in administering the NRCs in Hong Kong.
Grievance of Lacking Support to Non-refoulement Claimants
As mentioned above, NRCs face a prolonged screening process in the USM which is 
alleged to be abused by bogus asylum seekers as mentioned above.  On the other hand, 
the situation is widely criticized by human rights activists, refugee group and critics that 
USM is overly harsh, deeply flawed and designed to screen people out.  The recognition
rate of USM, which stands at 0.6 per cent since it was introduced in 2014 is worryingly 
low when being compared to the recognition rate of 60 per cent in European countries.
In a number of interviews with NRCs and asylum seekers who was managed to be 
recognized in USM conducted by reporters and journalists, those interviewees recalled that 
they were in terror with nightmare after they left their home country to survive due to 
torture and political and religious percussions.  Most of them have their life broken and 
are still in trauma, but at the same time are required to go through bureaucracy and a series 
of interviews and documentations as requested by ImmD.  NRCs also found their 
situations more difficult when they are not able to work in Hong Kong and need to tolerate 
comments and labels of ‘fake refugees’, ‘criminals’ and ‘black labour’.  A portion of them 
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feel ashamed and hopeless and are required to attend counselling, or in medication for 
depression and other illnesses.
It is also heavily criticized that the areas of assistance available to those vulnerable NRCs 
are grossly narrow and inadequate.  Those assistances could barely meet their basic needs 
of survival which further damage their dignity and social status. Moreover, life is tough for 
NRCs who are facing language barrier, discrimination and culture shock. It is a common 
phenomenon for claimants to be discriminated by local Hong Kong people who are 
reluctant to communicate with them and refused to rent properties to them at market price.  
A large portion of asylum seekers are forced to reside in accommodations in remote 
location, sub-standard hygiene and poor facilities and living condition such as subdivided
flats, and are in fact isolated from the community.
Due to the recent heat debate, intense coverage by some media outlets and political parties 
portraying NRCs as fake asylum seekers, illegal economic immigrants and syndicated 
criminals, as well as the emphasis by government officials about the abuse of the USM, the 
refugee cause earns minimal sympathy and support from the general public.  As claimed 
by human rights group of NRCs, the scale of current situation of NRCs has been 
exaggerated which may fuel race discrimination and hostility towards NRCs and ethnic 
minorities, and create division in the community.
Despite there are allegations that the USM is abused by bogus asylum seekers and illegal 
economic immigrant, there is a lack of support, both in term of economic and social, to 
NRCs who are minority group in the society with low social status, poor living standard 
and community bonding.  The situation renders the community of NRCs vulnerable to 
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exploitation and ill treatment in Hong Kong and change in government policy is thus long 
desired.
Concluding Comments
According to the above analysis on the policy dynamics under current situations, it is 
widely accepted that the policy window has widely opened for a better policy choice.  To 
comply with the relevant conventions and laws to protect the real refugees while safeguard 
the welfare of Hong Kong citizens, the Government under “Regulated Self-governance” 
has to line up all stakeholders and launch a comprehensive review of policy tools in 
handling non-refoulement claims with no further delay.  
According to ImmD’s information, 51% of claimants were smuggling into Hong Kong as 
IIs while 47% of which were overstayers or visitors being refused to land.  In order to 
intercept IIs on land and at sea as well as deter the human trafficking syndicates at the 
source, the Hong Kong Police has set up a joint investigation team together with other 
enforcement agencies, including ImmD and the Customs and Excise Department, which 
should be regarded as “Capacity Building” locally in the enforcement against bogus NRCs. 
In the meantime, the Ministry of Public Security has also started coordinating its Border 
Control Department and Immigration Authorities in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and 
Xinjiang to work jointly with Hong Kong Police through interception, investigation, 
intelligence and enforcement with a view to combating cross border smuggling activities.
As regards “asylum visa” issue which may create social problems to Hong Kong, the 
Government will consider seeking Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to liaise with the 
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Indian Government or else (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Nigeria) to stop the intermediaries arranging its nationals to come to 
Hong Kong and make non-refoulement claims. 
To reduce human trafficking or smuggling of IIs to Hong Kong, law enforcement agencies 
need to step up responsive enforcement actions.  On the other hand, as many as close to 
50% of the claimants have smuggled themselves into Hong Kong.  To achieve the 
deterrence effect, penalties against human trafficking or smuggling of IIs activities, in 
particular to aiding and abetting syndicates, should be enhanced through legislative 
amendments, for example revising Immigration (Unauthorized Entrants) Order (Cap. 115D) 
by expanding the definition of "unauthorized entrants" to include major source countries. 
The change of system and strategies against those illegal activities and abusers of the 
system has been expeditiously stepped up with a view to fulfilling the expectation of the 
society. On the other hand, the Government has to take the welfare of the genuine 
claimants into consideration.  As such, the USM should be modified and streamlined in 
order to enhance its effectiveness while meet the high standards of fairness as per the court 
rulings.  To reinforce “Regulated Self-governance” under close cooperation with the 
markets and stakeholders, the Government is collaborating with HKBA, LSHK, DLS and 
some NGOs to improve the existing USM.  In addition, the other aspects like uplifting the 
employment prohibition against the claimants pending assessment and legal aid services 
granted to the claimants are under review.  To formulate a legal base, it is necessary to 
enhance the existing administrative measures through the enactment of legislation.
During LegCo discussion, some councilors have suggested setting up open or closed 
-97-
reception centres for the claimants pending determination from screening procedures, with 
reference to the experience of handling Vietnamese boat people crisis in the 1980s.  
Although this proposal is a feasible move, it involves complicated problems in 
amendments of the existing legislation, capacity building to the responsibly agencies 
managing the centres, inducement to NGOs giving counselling and support to the 
claimants as well as extensive consultation from the councilors, other concerned groups 
and the public.  In coming chapter, the analysis on the above possible policy choices will 
go further deeper with reference to foreign practices. 
The Government is actually on the right track in managing the non-refoulement claims but 
more policy tools could be introduced with reference to the good foreign practices.  In 
addition, the Government could also take reference from Braithwaite’s regulatory pyramid 
in respect of sanctions and support when introducing the policy tools.  Taking into 
account the underprivileged status of NRC, the Government should consider and explore a 
range of support actions in building capacity of the society as whole to better handle 
asylum seekers such as improving the USM and educating the community before rushing
into taking enforcement actions.  In case the circumstance requires immediate 
intervention and stringent enforcement actions, policymakers should first use restorative 
and dialogue-based approach at the base of the pyramid of sanctions and move up in the 
pyramid only if situation persist.
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CHAPTER SIX: SELECTED OVERSEAS PRACTICES
Introduction
In this chapter, various countries practices in administrating the situation of asylum seekers 
are studied.  Respective worldwide countries, including Germany, Australia and the 
United Kingdom, are encountering the mass influx of asylum seekers.  .  These three 
countries are chosen as they are facing similar situation as in Hong Kong. In order to 
manage the situation, different policies are adopted and implemented.  The increasing 
numbers of asylum seekers in these three countries has caused great concerns to the 
citizens as well as the government in recent years.  Respective government endeavor to 
review and modify the asylum policy and the screening policy so as to administer the 
situation.  With the comprehensive study of the governance arrangements of these three 
countries on how the policies are initiated, the dynamics involved and the adoption of 
various policy tools, the Hong Kong government could take reference on the best practices
from overseas experiences.
In the following sections, an empirical analysis will be conducted on the policies adopted 
and implemented by various countries based on the analytical framework devised in the 
Chapter Two.  Elmore and McDonnel (1987) had categorised policy tools into 4 types, i.e. 
mandates, inducement, capacity building and system changing.  The four different 
dimensions of policy tools have indeed been currently adopted by respective government 
in administering the asylum seekers, which is going to be elaborated in the following 
paragraphs.
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Analysis of Overseas Practices - Germany
Situation
In 2014, the asylum applications in Germany were 173,072.  New asylum applications in 
Germany have nearly doubled to 362,1531 in the first 10 months of 2015 (between January 
and October 2015), due to the outbreak of European refugee crisis. In 2014, amongst 
97,275 initial decisions were made in Germany, in which 40,650 cases were granted 
protection. At the present moment, applicants had no deadline in submitting the 
applications upon their arrival.
Major Legislation and Implementation Authority
In Germany, Article 16a of the Basic Law grants victims of political persecution an 
individual right of asylum. According to the Asylum and Refugee policy in Germany, the 
fundamental right of asylum thus has high priority and expresses Germany’s willingness to 
fulfil its historical and humanitarian obligation to admit refugees. The admission 
procedure for asylum seekers is governed by the Asylum Procedure Act. Asylum seekers 
whom border authorities permit to enter the Federal Republic of Germany or who are 
found in the country without a residence permit are transferred to the nearest reception 
centre of the relevant state. In sum, the asylum seekers are assigned to reception centres 
of the individual German states according to a formula defined in the Asylum Procedure 
Act.
Screening Procedure
The standard screening procedure includes filing application form, submitting necessary 
1 Source from Asylum Information Database: Germany Country Report.
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identity proof and document and conducting personal interview. The asylum application 
is subsequently submitted to the responsible branch of the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF) for examination and decision. Asylum seekers receive a certificate of 
permission to reside which grants a preliminary right to stay in the Federal Republic of 
Germany during the asylum procedure.
BAMF case workers question the claimants (with the help of an interpreter) on their travel 
route and the reasons for persecution. Upon request, female claimants may be questioned 
by a trained female case worker if the reasons are unique to women. The interview is 
recorded in writing and translated into the claimants’ language. The decision on the 
application is based on the interview and the further enquiries if any. The claimants are 
notified of the decision in writing and are given information on legal remedy.
If the application is accepted, persons granted asylum status and those granted refugee 
status receive a temporary residence permit and are given the same status as Germans 
within the social insurance system. They are entitled to social welfare, child benefits, 
child-raising benefits, integration allowances and language courses as well as other forms 
of integration assistance.
If neither asylum nor refugee protection can be granted, the BAMF examines whether there 
are grounds for a deportation ban. The objective is to conduct an extensive review to 
ensure that there is no delay in processing. In general, claimants whose applications have 
been rejected are required to leave the country.
According to the directives on asylum procedures of the European Union ("EU"), "safe 
countries of origin" refers to those countries with stable democratic system and compliant 
with international human rights treaties.  Migrants from these sources are presumed to be 
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safe upon return.  The list of safe countries is different among member states of EU.  For 
instance, there are 26 countries included in the safe countries list in the UK, but only six in 
Germany.
Owing to the European refugee crisis, Germany amended the list of "safe countries" in 
2014 and 2015, adding countries like Serbia, Kosovo and Albania2.  Asylum seekers from 
these countries are still allowed to file application, but their applications are more likely to 
be dismissed, unless they could provide valid reasons that they face political persecution in 
their country of origin.  There is a separate airport procedure for applicants from safe 
countries of origins.  The whole process will not last more than 19 days and the applicants 
stayed in premises at the airport during the process.
Furthermore, fast-track measure is implemented for applicants from Syria, Eritrea and 
ethnic minorities from Iraq. The German government has skipped conducting personal 
interview with applicants from Syria and ethnic minorities from Iraq since November 2014, 
and applicants from Eritrea since June 2015 in the application process.
In general, publicly-funded legal assistance was available for applicants.  They are
required to pass some merit tests.  There is no cap on legal assistance.   Legal assistance 
was only available for appeal cases, but not in other stages of application and screening.
The above policies for administering and screening the asylum seekers following the laws 
in Germany and the directive of EU, which have been made to urge the German 
Government to formulate an effective system to screen the claims of a high standard of 
fairness in accordance with the relevant legislations and directives.  The German 
government implemented the above-mentioned policy tool to govern the screening process. 
2 Source from Germany: Parliament Adopts Legislative Package on Asylum and Refugees.
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In sum, the screening initiatives are considered to be “Mandate” as defined by Elmore and 
McDonnel (1987).
Appeal Procedure
Appeals can be first filed to the Administrative Court, and further appeals to the Higher 
Administrative Court and Federal Administrative Court.  If there is suspected violation of 
rights, the applicants can also lodge complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court.
Detention of Applicants
For up to three months after application, applicants stay in the initial reception centres 
which are not regarded as detention centres.  They can move out after three months.
Employment
Applicants pending decisions can generally be allowed to work after a three-month stay at 
the initial reception centres. The policy on the detention and employment are regarded as 
“Inducement” according to Elmore and McDonnel. Both policies encourage the asylum 
seekers to integrate into the community and allow them to earn money with a view to 
supporting themselves.  These policies could speed up the community integration and 
reduce the tension between the residents and the asylum seekers.
Publicly-funded Humanitarian Assistance to Claimants
Each applicant in reception facilities can receive monthly assistance ranging between €84 
(HK$865) and €143 (HK$1,473). For those staying outside, monthly assistance 
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ranged from €133 (HK$1,370) to €216 (HK$2,225).3 Applicants staying in the initial 
reception centres receive essential items in kind or vouchers, while those staying in 
accommodation outside the centres receive cash allowances.
Annual Public Expenditure
According to media reports, Germany spent a total of €1.5 billion (HK$15.45 billion) on 
asylum benefits in 2013.  The Germany Federal government is expected to spend €6 
billion (HK$61.8 billion) to cope with the influx of asylum applicants in 2015-2016, 
including €3 billion (HK$30.9 billion) for the states to accommodate the rising number of 
new arrivals of applicants.4
Policy Implications
As mentioned above, NRCs are allowed to access to the labour market, which results in the
relaxed freedom of movement of applicants.  This policy is welcomed by claimants and 
related interested parties.  Moreover, accelerated asylum procedure for the Syrian and 
other eligible countries is noted with satisfaction by different agencies, including Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe.
However, the continued influx of refugees overloads the asylum system in Germany and 
creates substantial government expenditure in administrating the NRCs.  Moreover, the 
mass influx of NRCs adversely affects the labour market, in which some local labour 
unions oppose the policy.  To address the above issues, the German government is 
looking into some policies.  One of the considerations is to deploy more resources in 
speeding up the screening process in assessment, which is catorgized as “Capacity 
3 Source from Germany: Parliament Adopts Legislative Package on Asylum and Refugees
4 Source from Germany: Parliament Adopts Legislative Package on Asylum and Refugees
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building” according to Elmore and McDonnel (1987) .
In Germany, asylum seekers whom border authorities permit to enter the Federal Republic 
of Germany or who are found in the country without a residence permit are transferred to 
the nearest reception centre of the relevant state. The policy creates tension between the 
Federal Government and state governments responsible for accommodating asylum 
applicants. To relieve the tension between the Federal Government and state 
governments, the German government is exploring the relevant policy to administer the 
distribution of NRCs.  According to Elmore and McDonnel (1987), this is a potential 
“System changing”.
Due to the increasing of NRCs landing in Germany and various interested parties raised 
concerns over the welfare of claimants, the policy window has recently opened. According 
to Knill and Tosun (2012), the type of governance currently being adopted by the current 
German Government in administering the non-refoulement claims is “Regulated 
Self-governance”, which is a mixture of hierarchy and market modes.  Undoubtedly, the 
government is the leading role in dealing with the situation and has legal obligation to 
solve the problems.
Analysis of Overseas Practices - Australia
Situation
As in 2014, the number of asylum applications in Australia was 18,7185. 68% of them 
enter Australia by boat, whilst the remaining of them (33%) entered by air.
5 Source from Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Government.
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Major Legislation and Implementation Authority
In Australia, Migration Act 1958 and Migration Regulations 1994 are implemented by the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection ("DIBP"). Applicants had no deadline 
in submitting the applications upon arrival.
Standard Screening Procedure
The screening procedure includes the submission of protection visa application form, 
conducting interview and making decision. Unlike Germany, there is no list of safe 
countries of origin.
Fast track assessment ("FTA") is implemented for a backlog of applications. FTA was 
introduced in Australia in December 2014, targeting the sudden influx of 30,000 asylum 
seekers by boat between August 2012 and December 2013.  While the duration of claim 
assessment under FTA is generally shorter, the review procedure for refused applications is 
handled without hearing.
Enhanced screening process ("ESP") is another screening policy implemented for 
applicants from Sri Lanka who arrive by boats. ESP was introduced in October 2012, as 
the number of asylum applicants from Sri Lanka surged that year.  If an asylum applicant 
does not raise any protection concerns during an initial interview made by DIBP, they are 
"screened out" and will be returned to Sri Lanka without having the opportunity to 
formally lodge a protection claim.  However, the system is criticized for lacking 
transparency and preventing asylum seekers from being able to have their claims assessed 
fairly.
In general, applicants held at closed detention centres have stayed in the country for an 
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average of 14 months in August 2015, according to DIBP.  According to the Refugee 
Council of Australia, for those living in the community on bridging visas, it was estimated 
that most of them have already stayed in Australia for at least two years for the opportunity
to lodge a claim.
The above policies for screening the claimants and fast track assessment are due to the 
sudden influx of claimants in 2010s. The sudden and mass influx of claimants has created 
tension between the Australia citizens and the concerned groups.  Some citizens criticized 
the mass influx of claimants affected the community, including the resources allocation and 
the law and order. In sum, the screening initiatives are considered to be “Mandate” as 
defined by Elmore and McDonnel (1987).
Appeal Procedure
Regarding the appeal procedure, decision is made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
("AAT") after hearing.
75% of review cases were finalized within 52 weeks (1 year) after lodgment. For the rest 
of 25% of review cases, they could not be concluded within 12 months due to the various 
reasons, including the delay caused by the backlog of cases, more than one hearing 
required, etc.
Availability of Publicly-funded Legal Assistance
The publicly-funded legal assistance is only available for those asylum applicants with 
valid visa.  Since 31 March 2014, the Australian government has restricted the access of 
publicly-funded legal assistance to those asylum seekers who arrived lawfully on valid 
visas In other words, those asylum seekers without valid visas are not covered.  Publicly 
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funded legal assistance to qualified asylum seekers are provided through the Immigration 
Advice and Application Assistance Scheme ("IAAAS") through its registered providers.  
The applicants are also required to pass the merit test.  The scope of legal assistance is 
well-defined and the assistance is only available for completion of application form and 
assessment procedure, but not in the appeal and judicial stages.  Expenditure on legal 
assistance in 2015 was AUD$2.5 million (HK$17.5 million).
Detention of Applicants
In 1992, the Australian government introduced the mandatory detention policy on asylum 
applicants.  "Unlawful non-citizens" would be detained in closed facilities.  However, 
since 2005, the Australian government has been moving away from such policy to other 
arrangements such as community detention and granting bridging visas that allow 
applicants to legally live in the community, after initial health, identity and security checks.  
By August 2015, only 11% of the overall asylum applicants stayed in closed detention 
centres, while the majority (87%) lived in the community with bridging visas.  The other 
2% lived in community detention centres.
The change in detention policy is considered to be “System Changing” as defined by 
Elmore and McDonnel (1987). The claimants are originally detained in the centres.  The 
policy changed when the concern groups criticized that the policy had deprived the
freedom and right of claimants.  After careful review, the Australian government
considered to modify the detention policy.  The claimants are allowed to live in the 
community. 
Employment
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They were not permitted to work.  In August 2012, the Australian government removed 
the right to work attached to bridging visas.
A single person can receive up to a welfare of AUS$1,020 (HK$7,140) per month, 
including rental assistance. Financial assistance is available for applicants living on 
bridging visas under the Asylum Seeker Assistance Scheme administered by the Australian 
Red Cross.
Annual public expenditure
In 2014-2015, humanitarian assistance amounted to AUS$143 million (HK$ 1,001 million), 
while legal assistance was AUS$2.5 million (HK$17.5 million).  The detention cost was 
AUS$2.9 billion (HK$20.3 billion).
Policy Implications
The non-refoulement policy in Australia has been regarded as effective in deterring 
irregular migrants. The gradual replacement of closed detention by community detention 
and bridging visas in recent years has been regarded as a move to bring Australia into a 
closer alignment with its international human rights obligations.
However, the government is seriously criticized for the fast-track screening procedures as 
the screening appears to be unfair and lack of transparency.
Similar to Germany, due to the increasing of NRCs landing and various interested parties 
raised concerns over the welfare of claimants, the policy window has recently opened. 
According to Knill and Tosun (2012), the type of governance currently being adopted by 
the current Australia Government in administering the non-refoulement claims is 
“Regulated Self-governance”.
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Analysis of Overseas Practices - The United Kingdom
Situation
In 2014, the asylum applications in the United Kingdom were 25,0336. These were new 
claims after implementation of the USM in March 2014.  
Major Legislation and Implementation Authority
In the United Kingdom (the UK), Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is 
implemented by the Home Office. Applicants must lodge application as soon as possible 
upon arrival in the UK.  Any delayed reporting may affect the credibility of the 
application.
Standard Screening Procedure
The screening procedure includes the lodging application, screening application, 
conducting interview and notifying decision.  Same as Germany, there is a list of safe 
countries of origin.
Detained fast track ("DFT") measure is adopted for asylum applicants but such measure 
has recently been suspended. The UK government introduced DFT in 2003.  For those 
asylum applicants whose statuses were expected to be able to be quickly decided, the 
applicants would be put into detention and were given two days to appeal the initial 
decision.  In 2014, there were 3,865 applicants accepted onto the fast track process.  
However, after the court ruled in July 2015 that DFT was "structurally unfair" to asylum 
6 Source from Refugee Council. Asylum Statistics Annual Trends.
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applicants, the measure has been suspended since late July 2015. More than half (52%)
of asylum applications were concluded within 52 weeks (one year) in 2014-2015.
The above policy for administering the claimants are developed after a number of court 
rulings which have been made to urge the Government to change the screening in 
accordance with the relevant conventions and local legislations. The initiative is regarded 
as “Mandates” as defined by Elmore and McDonnel (1987).
Appeal Procedure
Appeals could be made to the First Tier Tribunal, Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal.
Availability of Publicly-funded Legal Assistance
There was publicly-funded legal assistance.  The applicants were required to pass the 
merit tests.  The legal assistance is available throughout the entire screening and appeal 
procedure.
The expenditure on legal assistance in 2015 was £40 million (HK$511 million). This figure 
refers to the legal aid expenditure on completed immigration cases during the period from 
July 2014 to June 2015.  The scope of "immigration cases" includes asylum, 
immigration-detention, victims of trafficking and judicial review.
Regarding the legal assistance policy, in general, the government offers assistance to the 
claimants at all stages.  The UK government is exploring the policy tool in changing the 
scope in legal assistance, including the availability of assistance in difference stage of 
screening and the consideration of the ceiling in the amount of assistance. The change in 
legal assistance policy is considered to be “System Changing” as defined by Elmore and 
McDonnel (1987).
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Detention
The detained fast track was temporarily suspended, following the court judgment made in 
July 2015.
Employment
As a general rule, asylum applicants are not allowed to work in the UK.  However, 
asylum applicants who have waited for more than 12 months for an initial decision are 
eligible to apply for permission to work.
On grounds of humanitarian, each person could apply for cash allowance of £161 
(HK$2,057) per month, plus accommodation in kind if needed. In the UK, humanitarian 
assistance is provided to the destitute asylum applicants whilst their claims are being 
decided.  At the end of March 2015, around 30,500 asylum seekers were being supported.  
Each person could apply for cash allowance of £36.95 (HK$472) per week.
Annual asylum cost excluding detention and legal expenses was £235 million (HK$3,003 
million) in 2014-20157.
Policy Implications
In the UK, the government adopts measures in giving special care and protection to 
children.  The policy is welcomed by the concern groups and relevant agency, including 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Before the suspension of the detention measure, the detention policy was criticized as 
inhuman.  The detention period has no statutory time limit and there is no independent 
7 Source from Asylum Support: accommodation and financial support for asylum seekers
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agency to oversight this issue.
Similar to Germany, due to the increasing of NRCs landing and various interested parties 
raised concerns over the welfare of claimants, the policy window has recently opened. 
According to Knill and Tosun (2012), the type of governance currently being adopted by 
the current UK Government in administering the non-refoulement claims is “Regulated 
Self-governance”.
Concluding Comments
According to the above analysis on the governance, policy dynamics and policy tools in 
three different countries, it is obvious that the policy window has widely opened in these 
countries.  The refugee crisis in these countries remains a great concern for the 
community, particularly there were a number of violent incidents relating to the asylum 
seekers in these countries.  It is expected the asylum policy and the screening policy may 
be reviewed frequently in order to administer the situation.
Similar to Hong Kong government, the situation is causing higher and higher concerns to 
the public.  Taking reference with the practices in other countries, it is observed that the 
Hong Kong government can consider some policy tools, including the expedition of the 
USM, uplifting the employment prohibition and the establishment of close camp, to 
manage the situation.  In the following chapter, the potential policy tools will be critically 
analysed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
In the previous chapters, the NRC issue has been comprehensively researched and 
analysed in various perspectives. Hong Kong had faced an enormous challenge in the issue 
of VR occurred in the 1970s to 1990s. Through an in-depth study of the history of VR 
issue and the respective administration, the type of governance, policy dynamics, the 
policy tools adopted by the then Government had been clearly defined. The Government 
gained invaluable and pains-taking experience in tackling the problem of refugees. These 
experiences are beneficial to assist in analysing the current situation of NRC and devising 
possible solutions. After that, the current situation in administering the NRC has been 
comprehensively researched and analysed in different angles. By studying the prevailing 
practices adopted by the overseas countries in handling the refugee’s issues, it was 
observed that there were areas in common in which some recommendations can be 
referenced with their experience.
Having the above research and analysis, three feasible and practicable recommendations 
are suggested i) Expedition of USM, Uplift of Employment and the establishment of close 
camp. Each of the recommendation will be illustrated in detail and a conclusive suggestion 
will be given at the end of this chapter. 
Recommendation: Expedition of Unified Screening Mechanism (USM)
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Current Situation in Hong Kong
Since March 2014, the Hong Kong government implemented USM to determine for claims 
of non-refoulement applications. In general, claimants are required to make a 
non-refoulement claim application with necessary supporting documents if any. With the 
statutory period of 28 days as stipulated in the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, ImmD 
would provide extra 21 days for completing administration procedures for the applicants. 
Once the claim form is received, screening interviews will be arranged by the ImmD to the 
claimants, which generally be completed in 13 weeks.  Based on the supporting 
documents submitted by the claimants and assessment during screening interviews, the 
ImmD may determine the claim in around five weeks.  In theory, the non-refoulement 
claim could be finalised within six months upon its commencement.
However, the duration for screening a claim mostly depends on whether the claimants are 
cooperative during the process.  It was observed that many claimants delayed the 
processing time intentionally by failing to contact their duty lawyers, being absence for 
screening interviews or unwilling in submitting necessary supporting documents as 
requested by ImmD.
Inspiration from Overseas Experiences
Taking the experience from the overseas countries, we can be inspired with various 
recommendations suggested. Due to the indifference mode of governance, resources, 
culture and etc, some practices from overseas administrations may not be directly 
applicable to the situation of Hong Kong. However, a number of the prevailing procedures 
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and practices may be adopted by the Hong Kong administration.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, with the available information, the average required time for 
finalizing the asylum seeker applications were 7.1 months in Germany, 14 months in 
Australia and 52 week in UK. 
One of the major differences of average time span between those countries was that the 
Germany government implemented the "safe countries of origin" list, which was endorsed 
by the EU, during the application assessment. The list refers to those countries with stable 
democratic system and compliance with international human rights treaties.  Migrants 
from these sources are presumed to be safe upon return. The list of safe countries differs 
among member states of EU. The Germany government included countries like Serbia, 
Kosovo and Albania in the list. In this process, Asylum applicants from these countries are 
still allowed to file application, but their applications are more likely to be dismissed as 
manifestly unfounded, unless they could provide reasons to believe that they face political 
persecution in their country of origin in spite of the general situation there.  
For the three countries being analyzed, all those governments adopted some kinds of fast 
track measures. In Germany, adopted a fast-track measure for asylum applicants from Syria, 
Eritrea and ethnic minorities from Iraq in which personal interviews with these applicants 
were skipped since 2014 and 2015 to streamline the process. In addition, Australia 
government introduced FTA for a backlog of applications and ESP implemented for 
applicants from Sri Lanka who arrive by boats in 2012. Subject to legal challenges, those 
measures were criticized for lack of transparency and unfairness in assessment. In UK, 
DFT was adopted since 2003, but after the court ruled in July 2015 that DFT was 
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"structurally unfair" to asylum applicants, the measure has been suspended since late July 
2015.
Introduction of “Safe Country of Origin” List 
By taking reference of the list adopted in Germany, Hong Kong government may 
introduced to set up a similar list, namely “Safe Country of Origin” List (SCO list), to 
identify the countries with relative stable political situation (i.e. no domestic or 
international war is happening at that country) and comply with the international human 
right treaties. 
The Hong Kong government should closely liaise with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China via the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Hong Kong to gather the information of prospective countries to be added in the 
list. Moreover, the Hong Kong government should liaise with the consulates of the 
prospective countries in Hong Kong to gather the latest current situation with a view to 
determine for the inclusion of those countries into the list. In fact, efforts have been made 
and are ongoing to set up contacts with relevant governmental organisations in those 
countries for establishing an objective and credible database on information of major 
localities of source countries.
Before compilation of the list, vetting from the Department of Justice of Hong Kong 
government is required. Afterwards, the list should be submitted to UNHCR for clearance 
prior to implementation with a view to avoid any non-compliance to the international 
requirements. With the approval from the UNHCR, relevant ordinances and procedures are 
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required to be amended accordingly. Upon implementation, reviews should be made in the 
pilot stage to evaluate the effectiveness. An independent committee from government 
officials should be set up to regularly review and update the list. In wake of any sudden 
incident, the committee should also made consideration to either include, amend or remove 
any country onto/from the SCO list.
Advantages of SCO list
The major objective is to expedite the screening process for all cases and deter clear 
abusers, whilst ensuring that screening procedures will continue to meet with the high 
standards of fairness required by law.
With the SCO list, the assessment process of Non-refoulement claim is expected to be 
speeded up and the procedures would be streamlined for the applicants of the countries on 
the list. In the current situation, top five countries of origin of the claimants are south or 
southeast Asian countries, i.e. Vietnam (22%), India (19%), Pakistan (18%), Bangladesh 
(12%) and Indonesia (10%) which contributed 81% of the total applications. If some or all 
of those countries are included on the SCO list, a substantial improvement of the 
processing time may been observed. 
Disadvantages of SCO list
Regardless of the vetting from the DOJ and the approval from the UNHCR, the 
establishment of the list may subject to judicial review and legal challenges of “unfairness”. 
Criticisms may be made that the assessment is not comprehensive and jeopardize 
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individual merit of the case. In addition, the creditability of the independent committee is 
in question. 
Policy Tools
The establishment of the SCO list is adopting the policy tools of Mandate and System 
changing under Elmore and McDonnel (1987). It involves in law amendment and changing 
of the prevailing practices and streaming the process to expedite the processing time. With 
the implementation, the application time may be much shorter and subsequently reduce the 
expenditure for the overall assessment.
Recommendation: Uplift of Employment Prohibition
Current Situation in Hong Kong
In November 2009, the Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance 2009 came into effect where 
a new section 38AA to the Ordinance was added to prohibit those NRCs from taking any 
employment, or establishing or joining in any business. The number of NRCs arrested for 
illegal employment recorded over 1000 cases from 2009 to 2015. However, deterrence 
effect as being the initial objective of the amendment of Ordinance is still in question. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is observed that the majority of NRCs were actually fake 
refugees and attempted to seek illegal employment in Hong Kong while the applications 
were under processing. In a specific country, recent intelligence revealed that agencies or 
intermediaries are now available in India to provide one-stop service and provide 
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transportation for their nationals to Hong Kong, NRCs would be arranged to engage in 
unlawful employment in Hong Kong during the screening procedures.  This issue has 
been brought up in LegCo meeting, and the officials of Hong Kong government have also 
held meetings with the Consul General of India in Hong Kong to deter this kind of illegal 
activities.
Currently, the Director of Immigration (DOI) may grant permission to the screen-in 
claimants to take up employment in Hong Kong. DOI will consider such an application on 
a discretionary and exceptional basis, taking into consideration an array of factors such as 
details of the intended employment and the prospective employer, personal circumstances, 
health condition and etc. However, some refugee concern groups criticized that the process 
of granting permission to work by DOI takes unduly long time and most importantly, 
permission is rarely granted. In response to the long processing time, the ImmD revealed in 
2014 that they were able to make a decision in two to five weeks after all the required 
information and supporting documents had been received from the applicants.
Inspiration from Overseas Experiences
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Asylum applicants pending decisions can generally be allowed 
to work after a three-month stay at the initial reception centres in Germany. 
In Australia, the government removed the right to work in 2012. Asylum seekers applicants 
would be provided with financial assistance including rental assistance the Australian Red 
Cross.
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In UK, asylum applicants are not allowed to work in the UK for the first 12 months of 
asylum seekers application.  However, asylum applicants who have waited for more than 
12 months for an initial decision are eligible to apply for permission to work.
Conditional employment in Hong Kong
In striking the balance between the security concerns to the society and the personal needs 
of the Non-refoulement applicants, the stringent measure of employment prohibition is 
recommended to be relaxed. It is suggested that the Non-refoulement applicants may allow 
to work after six months upon all the required documents have been submitted. In addition, 
they are only allowed to take a certain kinds of employment. The government should 
explore the local labour market and determine which certain kinds of jobs are lacking of 
manpower resources in Hong Kong.
Nowadays, the Hong Kong government adopted the Supplementary Labour Scheme (SLS) 
which imports labours at technician level or below and allows employers with genuine 
difficulties in finding suitable employees locally to import workers from outside the 
HKSAR. As such, it is recommended that those Non-refoulment claimants are only 
permitted to work in those sectors. This policy may only have minimal effect to the local 
labour market with the relaxation of employment restriction. Furthermore, those kinds of 
jobs usually require low technical skills and knowledge which are easily trained and 
suitable for short term contract.  
In addition, it is also suggested that those screen-in refugee will automatically granted 
permission to work without having to submit any application to DOI. As the screen-in 
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claimants are allowed to stay in Hong Kong pending for resettlement overseas and 
determined as being the genuine victims, on humanitarian grounds, they should be allowed 
to work to earn their own living. Those claimants are not subject to any employment 
restrictions mentioned above. Given the few amount of screen-in cases, the effect to the 
local labour market is insignificant. 
Advantages of Conditional Employment
From the perspective of the NRCs, it was an incentive for the genuine ones to swiftly 
submit all the required documents and thus expedite the whole process of the screening. 
For the fake claimants, as they are able to submit all the required documents and failing to 
show up the interviews, they are unable to take up legal employment in any ways. 
Moreover, as the government has been spending substantial expenditure to provide 
financial and welfare assistance, relaxation of the employment restriction would save 
considerable amount of expenditure.
Disadvantages of Conditional Employment 
Obviously, public concerns would be a great issue as it adversely affects the local labour 
market even though regarding only a certain employment sectors. In the security concerns 
to the community, as those non screen-in claimants may also taking employment in Hong 
Kong, it may again induce or attract more prospective claimants coming to Hong Kong. 
Also, the ordinance had been amended in 2009 to inhibit employment, change in this 
policy would reflect the capricious image of the Hong Kong government.
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Policy Tools 
The types of policy adopted of Conditional employment are Mandate and Inducement 
under Elmore and McDonnel (1987). It involves in law amendment and changing of the 
prevailing practices and streaming the process to allow the claimants to have more freedom 
in terms of employment at the same time to supplement the inadequate labour force in 
certain markets. With the implementation, the whole processing time may also be shorten 
by inducing the genuine claimants to submit all the required documents so as to expediting 
the screening process.
Recommendation: Establishment of Detention Camp
Current Situation in Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, there is no detention camp designated for NRCs.  In general, many 
claimants come to Hong Kong illegally.  They enter in Hong Kong illegally with different 
means, such as sneaking on boat or hiding inside the cross-border trucks.  Their illegal 
status are revealed when they are intercepted by the law enforcement agencies, including 
Hong Kong Police Force and the Immigration Department.  They were detained in an 
Immigration Centre pending further processing.  The purpose of the centre is to process 
the illegal immigrants.  In the course of processing, many illegal immigrants launch their 
non-refoulement claims based on different reasons.  Hence, they are not removed. Instead, 
the HK government allows them to stay in the community pending the result of 
non-refoulement assessment.   In that sense, Hong Kong does not the detention camp for 
NRCs.  The claimants are only required to report to the Immigration Centre regularly, say 
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one time in every six months, to update the assessment progress and handle other 
administrative issues.
Inspiration from Overseas Experiences
Taking the experience from the overseas countries, detention camp could be considered as 
an option. Due to the indifference mode of governance, resources, culture and etc, some 
practices from overseas countries may not be directly applicable to the situation of Hong 
Kong. However, a number of the prevailing procedures and practices may be adopted by 
the Hong Kong administration.
As mentioned in before, in some countries, the policy in detention camp could speed up 
screening process.  As the claimants are detained in the camp, it would be more efficient
for the law enforcement agency to process the application.  Unlike the current situation in 
Hong Kong, when the claimants enjoy their freedom to stay in the community, the agency 
could barely manage the cooperativeness of claimants.  It is not unusual that the claimants 
do not report to the Immigration Centre at the designated date. When the claimants do not 
report to the Centre, the Immigration officer would attempt to locate them with their
provided address and telephone.  However, it is common to observe that the Immigration 
officer could not reach the claimants with the provided information. This situation certainly 
hinders the progress in the assessment of non -refoulement claimants.
Introduction of Detention Camp
The consideration of Detention Camp is a complicated decision. Taking reference of the 
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experience of other countries, many concern groups or interested parties would show 
strong opposition to this policy tool. One of the key arguments is that the detention camp 
deprives the right and freedom of the claimants. They are detained in the close facility, 
which restrict their freedom. It would definitely attract the judicial review in the depriving
of human rights of the claimants. In addition, the detention camp restricts the claimants’
interaction with the community. They are not able to integrate into the community during 
the detention period. It would be make them more difficult to join the community when 
they pass the screening sometime later. 
When considering the detention camp, the Hong Kong government should consider few 
aspects. Firstly, the choice of location is a key issue. It is expected the local residents 
would oppose the detention camp to be built in their residential district. The local residents 
would concern over the security of the camp, including the capacity of the law 
enforcement agency in managing the camp. On the other hand, some friends of the 
claimants may also visit the claimants inside the camp. This would create another security 
concerns.
There are some suggestions that the camp should be located in outlying island, which is far 
away from the city. And some politicians even suggest that the Hong Kong government
should work closely with the People’s Republic of China and arrange the camp to be 
situated in the Mainland. For the former proposal, it would definitely substantial resources, 
including time and financial expenses, in building a detention camp in outlying island. 
Hence, it would be a rather long-term proposal if the public support it. Regarding the latter 
proposal, it would involve some legal implications. If the camp is situated in the Mainland, 
there is legal implication for the officers from Hong Kong law enforcement agency in 
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executing their duty and power. In general, the Hong Kong law enforcers do not the power 
to manage the camp situated in the Mainland as the legislations only empower them to 
execute their power in Hong Kong. On the other hand, if the claimants break the law in the 
camp, it is questionable whether the claimants should face the punishment in Hong Kong 
legislation or the Mainland legislation. There are a number of legal implications in 
arranging the claimants being detained in the camp in the Mainland, particularly “One 
Country, Two System” is a controversial discussion topic in Hong Kong. It is forecasted 
that many politicians would oppose this proposal and even exaggerate it as the damage to 
“One Country, Two System”.
Secondly, the management of detention camp is another concern. If the claimants are 
detained in the camp, it would have resources implications to the law enforcement agency. 
The agency is required to redeploy more manpower and resources in managing the camp. 
In general, the claimants are rather strong-built, the officers are required to receive suitable 
training in dealing with the claimants, especially when some claimants turn emotional or 
violent. The officers may need some equipment to put the violent detainee under control. 
Definitely, resources are required to offer training and equipment to the law enforcers. 
There is past experience in overseas countries that the detainees created riot inside the 
camp in order to escape from the camp. Hence, security management is another 
consideration in managing the detention camp.
Thirdly, the arrangement of different claimants inside the detention camp is also another 
consideration. Some claimants may be a genuine asylum seeker and are cooperative with 
the law enforcers in the screening process. Resource-wise, the Hong Kong government 
may consider giving exemption for them to be detained in the camp. They can mingle in 
-126-
the community to enhance their integration with the public. Undoubtedly, there should be a 
comprehensive screening on the potential genuine claimants, in which the Hong Kong 
government may consider their degree of cooperation with law enforcers, the submission
of their supporting evidences…etc. Regarding other claimants, the law enforcers may 
consider to categorize them for different level of detention. For claimants without genuine
proof in assessment, they can be considered to be detained until the result of assessment. 
For claimants who show some degree of cooperation and produce some supporting 
evidence, the government could consider to allow them to report the camp in certain period 
of time, such as daily, twice a week or once a month. The law enforcers could adjust the 
reporting period depends on the cooperativeness of the claimants. It would help the law 
enforcement agency in managing the situation of claimants. Furthermore, it could save the 
resources in managing the camp and prioritize the resources in dealing with the claimants, 
who are likely to be troublemakers.
Advantages of Detention Camp
The major objective is to managing the claimants, which could expedite the screening 
process for all cases and deter clear abusers. It could ensure the screening procedures will 
continue to meet with the high standards of fairness required by law.
Disadvantages of Detention Camp
The establishment of the camp is likely to subject to judicial review and legal challenges of 
“unfairness”. Criticisms may be made that the assessment is not comprehensive and 
jeopardize individual merit of the case. In addition, the creditability of the independent 
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committee is in question. 
Policy Tools
The establishment of the detention camp is adopting the policy tools of Mandate and 
Capacity building under Elmore and McDonnel (1987). It involves in law amendment and
capacity building in the establishment of the detention camp. With the implementation, the 
management of the claimants would become more effective, in which the screening 
process could be enhanced
Application of Policy Tools in Array of Recommendations: Pyramid of Support 
According to Braithwaite (2011), in applying responsive regulatory theory in order resolve 
the problem arising in different areas, a public or private regulator should not rush to law 
enforcement solutions to resolve the problem before considering and exploring a range of 
approaches that support capacity building.  In general, regulators then use the pyramid of 
supports and seek to try one strategy after another that might further build strengths on a 
foundation by moving up from the lower levels of the pyramid.  Regulators should strive 
to move up in the pyramid of support in order to further expand strengths of the regulated 
actors to solve more and more problems of concern.
If escalating actions in the support pyramid failed to solve specific problems sufficiently, 
regulators should resort to the pyramid of sanction.  
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Figure 6.1 Pyramid of Support for Non-refoulement Claimants
Regarding the above figure 6.1, it is a diagram illustrated for the regulators, the Hong 
Kong government, in providing incentives to the prospective genuine NRCs. Currently, the 
welfare assistance is provided by the NGO which is offered tendering contracts from SWD. 
As being the foundation of the pyramid of support, Hong Kong government should review 
the current welfare assistance programme whether the assistance itself is sufficient for the 
present needs. Moreover, the SWD should closely monitor the operation of the authorized 
NGOs. A comprehensive complaint mechanism should also be established.  As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, HD and EDB are currently providing medical and education assistance 
respectively. Other than the mentioned welfare, it is recommended that the rent assistance 
should be increased from HKD $1500 to HKD $2000 as the flat prices surged over the 
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time. Alternatively, Housing Authority may make use of some long vacant public housing 
flats to serve as temporary flats for the NRCs. By reviewing the welfare assistance, the 
genuine prospective NRCs will be given more financial support and even accommodation 
to resist the high inflation rate and rising property market.    
On top of the foundation, the Hong Kong government may adopt the above mentioned 
SCO list to expedite of the screening process. At the top of the pyramid , the Hong Kong 
government may apply the relaxation of the employment prohibition by allowing screen-in 
claimant to work automatically and NRC six months after all the required documents are 
submitted. 
With the pyramid of support, the Hong Kong government will evaluate the situation of the 
issue to determine in escalating while the issue is improving or descending while the issue 
is deteriorating. For the worst case, the pyramid of support may be suspended until 
situation is warrant and considering adopting the pyramid of sanction.
Application of Policy Tools in Array of Recommendations: Pyramid of Sanctions 
According to Braithwaite (2011), regulators should first use restorative and dialogue-based 
approach at the base of pyramid of sanctions to ensure compliance and improvement by 
regulated actors.  If the regulated actors still decline to have dialogue or display negative 
feeback by showing persistent defiance, regulators would resort to moving up in the
sanction pyramid to take inccreasingly demanding intervention and punitive approaches, 
from shame, sanctions proseutions and punishment to incapacitation.
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Figure 6.2 Pyramid of Sanctions for Non-refoulement Claimants
Regarding the above figure 6.2, it is a diagram illustrated for the regulators, the Hong 
Kong governement, in implementing sanctions to the NRCs.  In general, the NRCs first 
entered the Mainland and then smuggled into Hong Kong with different methods, such as 
by boat or hiding inside the cross-boundary truck.  As being the foundation of the 
pyrmaid of sanction, Hong Kong government should enhance the enforcement actions 
against the sydicate into arranging the NRCs coming to Hong Kong.  The law 
enforcement agencies shall maintain close liasion with the Mainland Authority to 
strengthen the enforcement actions against the sydicate.  Furthermore, deterrent 
punishment, such as enhanced imprisonment, shall be considered.
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On top of the foundation, the Hong Kong government may devise a SCO list, in which 
some countries or areas are identified as relatively stable in political situation.  The SCO 
list could ensure those bogus NRCs could be repatriated to his/her country of origin 
promptly.  With the implementation of a SCO list, it could stop the mass influx of bogus 
NRCs as they were aware that repatriation would be enforced.
At the top of the pyramid, the Hong Kong government may consider the Close Camp.  
NRCs are detained in the camp when they were located in Hong Kong.  In the extreme 
situation, they are not allowed to leave the camp.  It would help the government in 
managing the NRCs situation.
Main Conclusions
All in all, three practicable and viable recommendations have been suggested: (i) 
Expedition of USM; (iii) Uplift of Employment; and (iii) Establishment of Closed Camp.
Although there are shortcomings for these recommendations, the advantages outweigh 
those unfavourable factors. For Expedition of USM by different approaches such as 
introducing the SCO list, genuine NRCs are induced to submit the required documents 
with a view to expedite the screening process. For Uplift of Employment, the welfare of 
the NRC are greatly improved at the same time decrease the enormous expenditure of the 
Government in providing relevant assistance to them.  For establishment of close camp, 
the NRC could be more effectively monitor and have a positive effect to the public security. 
All these recommendations employed the policy tools of Mandate, System Changing, 
Inducement and Capacity building under Elmore and McDonnel (1987). It is suggested 
that the Government may apply all of the recommendations simultaneously in order to 
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have the largest effect to administer the issue. 
Moreover, further analysis in applying the policy tools in array of recommendations has 
been conducted. The pyramid of support and sanctions are employed. It was suggested that 
the Government should make regular review to evaluate the situation and apply the 
appropriate magnitude of the policy tools. In other words, in short term, the foundation of 
pyramid of support and sanctions i.e. review of welfare and Enforcement, can be applied. 
If the situation improve in a certain period of time, then the Government may consider to 
move up the pyramid of support and suspend the actions in the pyramid of sanction. Vice 
versa, the Government may consider to take actions in the higher level of pyramid of 
sanction. In alternative, the pyramid of support and sanction can be applied concurrently. 
In the long term, the ultimate objective is to effective administer the NRC and provide 
necessary assist the genuine NRC in accordance with the conventions by applying the 
appropriate level of pyramid of support or sanction individually or concurrently.
Final Observations
The objective of this project is to recommend practical, appropriate and feasible policy 
choices for the Hong Kong Government to administer the NRC through i) in-depth study 
and analysis on the current foreign practices; ii) the Governance, political dynamics and 
policy tools adopted by the then Government to handle the challenge over the VR and iii) 
the inspiration of the overseas countries via thorough analysis.
By analyzing policy processes, an analytical framework has been initially set out, it 
comprises three interrelated aspects of importance: the governance arrangements 
concerning how policies are initiated, regulated and sustained under Knill and Tosun 
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(2012),; the reasons for, and dynamics involved in, the adoption of particular policies 
under Kingdon (2003); and the action taken through the use of various policy tools under 
Elmore and McDonnel (1987) with the supplement application of array of actions under 
Braithwaite (2011).
This project commenced with the study on the policies adopted by the then Hong Kong 
Government to administer VBP issue by means of a variety of policy tools. With the 
evolution and development regarding refugee handling in Hong Kong illustrated, policies 
adopted have been analyzed. 
The current situation of the NRC was then thoroughly analyzed which was the major 
foundation of “how”, “what” and “why” the Hong Kong government in arranging different 
policies. The influx of the NRCs and high standards required for managing the claimants 
has generated a number of social problems and the situation is becoming extremely 
alarming. To comply with the relevant conventions and laws in protection of the NRC 
while safeguard the welfare of Hong Kong citizens, the Government all along employed 
“Regulated Self-governance” in dealing the issue. It was observed that the Government 
introduced various policy tools in order to combat illegal activities and to deter the abusers 
of the Non-refoulemnt screening mechanism as well as to take the welfare of the genuine 
claimants into consideration.
By analysis on the governance, policy dynamics and policy tools in three different foreign 
countries, it revealed that the policy window has widely opened in these countries. With 
the overseas country experience and similarity to the situation in Hong Kong, 
recommendations made in the forthcoming have been greatly inspired. 
This project integrates various theories on modes and types of governance policy dynamic 
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and the adoption of particular policies through the use of policy tools. Through the 
systematic analysis across various scholars’ theories, the project identified that the mode 
and type of Governance has been all along to be “Regulated Self-governance” in 
administration of asylum seekers in the VR issue and the current NRC. With the 
tremendous attention drawn from the press and public, the Government inevitably has to 
take an active role to formulate and introduce suitable political choice so that the problems 
led by the problematic or bogus claimants could be properly addressed and tackled. In 
response to the imminent situation, the policy window has widely opened for a better 
policy choice.  
Having the above research and analysis, three feasible and practicable recommendations 
are suggested i) Expedition of USM, Uplift of Employment and the establishment of close 
camp. All these recommendations employed the policy tools of Mandate, System Changing, 
Inducement and Capacity building under Elmore and McDonnel (1987). It is suggested 
that the Government may apply all of the recommendations simultaneously in order to 
have the largest effect. Moreover, further analysis in applying the policy tools in array of 
recommendations has been conducted. The pyramid of support and sanctions are employed. 
It is suggested that the Government should make regular review to evaluate the situation 
and apply the appropriate magnitude of the policy tools.
With the analytical framework set in this project, inter-relationship between mode of 
governance, observing the policy dynamics and evaluation of tools and situation requiring 
the government to choose policy arrangement has been identified and clearly illustrated. It 
is believed such an analytical framework could assist the government in formulating 
appropriate, effective and timely policies and tools to administer the NRC which are 
beneficial to the society. The government is recommended to use the above framework to 
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formulate, review and evaluate, not only the policy tools adopted in the aspect of NRC 
issue, but also other measures in different policy areas.
-END-
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